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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen an unprecedented explosion in the
number of civil society organizations seeking to influence national and in-
ternational policy making and implementation.' Global leaders, activists,
scholars, and policy experts have increasingly called for the inclusion of
civil society in international governance and in the national implementa-
tion of international commitments. 2 Most recently, the wave of civil upris-
ings that swept the Middle East and North Africa has put fostering civil
1. The number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that sought to impact pol-
icy in issues ranging from human rights to the environment nearly doubled in the 1990s,
growing from 23,600 in 1991 to 44,000 in 1999, and has continued to grow at a similar pace
since then. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 8 (2000), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf; 5 Y.B. INT'L ORGs. 33, fig.2.9 (Union of
Int'l Ass'ns ed., 2011). http://www.uia.be/yearbook-international-organizations-online
2. These actors have emphasized the importance of civil society participation in myr-
iad contexts, which are too many to list here. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OP-
TIONS FOR IMPROVING ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND CSOs ix (2005)
(proposing "options for promoting more effective civic engagement in Bank-supported activ-
ities"); Sophie Thoyer & Benoit Martimort-Asso, Introduction: Participation for Sus-
tainability in Trade, in PARTICIPATION FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN TRADE 1, 5 (Sophie Thoyer &
Benoit Martimort-Asso eds., 2007) (describing the demands of civil society organizations for
"more direct citizen participation in the international rule-making process" at the IMF,
World Bank, and WTO); Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks to the Community of
Democracies: Civil Society: Supporting Democracy in the 21st Century (June 3, 2010) (argu-
ing that a strong civil society "undergirds both democratic governance and broad-based pros-
perity" and exhorting the United Nations to "do more to protect civil society").
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society participation high on the agenda of national governments and in-
ternational organizations. Indeed, most international organizations have
devised mechanisms to engage with civil society3 and regard civil society
participation as contributing to their legitimacy, accountability, and
effectiveness. 4
The meaning of "civil society," however, is deeply ambiguous. It has
been interpreted in a variety of ways reflecting conflicting underlying nor-
mative values and commitments.5 International organizations have used
the term "civil society" inconsistently, betraying this lack of consensus and
clarity about its meaning. For example, in his address to the General As-
sembly urging international organizations to engage civil society in global
governance, then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined
civil society as encompassing all nongovernmental entities, including busi-
ness and industry.6 In contrast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
excludes individual profit-oriented enterprises from its definition of civil
society but includes "business forums" that aggregate and lobby on behalf
of private, for-profit business interests.7 An official U.N. Report on
United Nations-Civil Society relations (the Cardoso Report) adopts a nar-
3. Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Govern-
ance, 39 GOv'T & OPPOSITION 211, 215 (2004) (noting that "[miost global governance agen-
cies have now devised mechanisms of one kind or another to engage . . . with .. . initiatives
from civil society associations" and giving examples).
4. Reflecting a growing consensus that civil society participation contributes to the
legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness of international organizations and national gov-
ernments, former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has recently characterized civil society
involvement as "not an option but a necessity." Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Open-
ing Address to Fiftieth DPI/NGO Conference (Sept. 10, 1997). Numerous other examples of
international organizations endorsing civil society participation as increasing their legitimacy
and accountability could be cited. See, e.g., U.N. Panel of Eminent Persons on United Na-
tions-Civil Society Relations, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global
Governance, transmitted by letter dated June 7, 2004 from the Chairman of the Panel, 1 9,
U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004) [Hereinafter Cardoso Report] (arguing that civil society
was one of the "emerging pillars" of a new, stronger framework of global governance with
enhanced "democratic accountability to citizens everywhere"). In the global trade context,
Pascal Lamy applauded civil society organizations for "joining hands to better influence the
work of the WTO." Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., WTO, Keynote Address to WTO Public Forum
(Oct. 4, 2007). In the field of development, the World Bank credited its consultations with
civil society with "improv[ing] the quality of policymaking ... and promot[ing] public sector
transparency and accountability." WORLD BANK, CONSULTATIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY OR-
GANIZATIONS, GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR WORLD BANK STAFF 3 (2000).
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL EDWARDS, CIVIL SOCIETY 4 (2004) (likening civil society to "a
concept that seems so unsure of itself that definitions are akin to nailing jelly to the wall");
Robert C. Post & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 1,
1 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) ("Civil society is so often invoked in so
many contexts that it has acquired a strikingly plastic moral and political valence."). For a
comprehensive historical account of the concept of civil society, see generally JOHN EHREN-
BERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999).
6. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Democratization, 1 85, U.N. Doc. A/51/
761 (Dec. 20, 1996).
7. Factsheet: The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept.
2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/civ.pdf.
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rower definition that excludes industry lobby groups and business federa-
tions.8 Some international organizations and supranational bodies, such as
the World Health Organization, appear to use the terms "civil society" and
"non-governmental organizations" (NGOs) interchangeably, and to favor
the participation of nationally and internationally recognized NGOs in
policy making and enforcement. 9 Yet other international bodies, such as
the World Bank, focus on the role of local civic associations in developing
the capacity of citizens to participate in public life.10
The wide range of definitions and uses of "civil society" and the diver-
sity of actors encompassed by each definition has prompted some to doubt
its worth as an analytical category." But calls to do away with the concept
of civil society are misguided. First, the idea of civil society remains of
crucial practical importance, as it is embedded in the language of interna-
tional organizations and national governments; thus, current scholarship
must engage with the varied meanings ascribed to it. Second, although
critics of the use of the term "civil society" as an analytical category are
correct that current uses of the term provide little guidance for how the
wide variety of groups that make up civil society should interact with inter-
national bodies and national implementation mechanisms, this deficiency
stems from a thin, poorly theorized understanding of the concept of civil
society, not from its analytical futility. Third, different normative under-
standings of civil society counsel different prescriptive outcomes, including
different institutional designs.
Two strands of scholarship have studied the relationship between non-
state actors and international organizations. The first seeks to reconcile
the reality of the growing impact of nonstate actors with international law
8. Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 7, 13. The Cardoso Report differentiates "civil
society" from the "private sector" and explicitly emphasizes the "public benefit" functions of
civil society, that is "a type of civil society organization that is formally constituted to provide
a benefit to the general public or the world at large through the provision of advocacy or
services." Id. This definition excludes both industry lobby groups and business federations.
Id.
9. See Christophe Lanord, World Health Organization Civil Society Initiative [WHO-
CSI], A Study of WHO's Official Relations System with Nongovernmental Organizations, $I
1-3, CSI/2002/WP4 (June 2002). Several other documents authored by the WHO's Civil Soci-
ety Initiative also use the terms civil society and NGO interchangeably. See, e.g., Rene
Loewenson, WHO-CSI & Training & Res. Support Ctr. [TARSC], Overview of Issues from
the Bibliography on Civil Society and Health, 4, CSI/2003/BI1 (Apr. 2003), available at http://
www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/overview.php ("In this bibliography the term non government or-
ganisation (NGO) is used to mean the same thing as CSOs.").
10. The World Bank has designed a variety of initiatives to "empower vulnerable and
marginalized groups." World Bank, Demand for Good Governance: Global Call for Propos-
als, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/T7KOXEQLIO (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
11. See, e.g., John Grimond, Civil Society, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2001, at 18 (urging that the
concept of civil society be abandoned because the concept has little foundation in established
theory). Krishan Kumar voiced similar concerns, characterizing current scholarly writing on
civil society as "an interesting exercise in intellectual history but it [nevertheless] evades the
real political challenges at the end of the twentieth century." Krishan Kumar, Civil Society:
An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, 44 BRIT. J. Soc. 375, 392 (1993).
608 [Vol. 34:605
Conceptions of Civil Society
theory, which has traditionally focused on relationships between sovereign
states. This debate has centered on whether nonstate actors can be consid-
ered subjects of international law-thus possessing international legal per-
sonality with both global rights and responsibilities-and on the
development of international law theories that would account for the ac-
tual influence of nonstate actors in international lawmaking and
implementation. 12
A second strand of scholarship has focused on the legitimacy and ac-
countability of both nonstate actors and the international legal system it-
self. These scholars are concerned with two types of democratic deficits.
The first relates to nonstate actors themselves and asks whether they are
legitimate participants in the international legal system. Concerns regard-
ing their legitimacy stem from their perceived lack of accountability to the
global system on which they exert increasing political power.' 3 The second
type of democratic deficit relates to what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
have termed the "club model" of international law, in which a relatively
small number of cabinet ministers from a relatively small number of coun-
tries (primarily from the North) get together in international institutions
to make rules of international law.14 "Club model" institutions suffer from
a democratic deficit because they lack transparency and accountability
mechanisms. 15 In this context, some scholars view civil society engagement
12. Both adherents of the process school of international law (the "New Haven
School") and transnational process scholars criticize the doctrine of international legal per-
sonality as unsuited to describe the role of nonstate actors in lawmaking and implementation.
The New Haven School prefers the term "participants" to describe how multiple actors en-
gage with international law. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 49-51 (1999); W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner &
Andrew R. Willard, The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 322 YALE J. INT'L L. 575
(2007). Transnational Process scholars employ the dynamic concept of "transnational legal
personality" to describe those actors whose actions, through any number of social interac-
tions, influence the content of international law norms. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Trans-
national Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181-207 (1996). In contrast, international law
"skeptics" both on the right and on the left have cautioned against the expansion of nonstate
actors' participation in international law. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law emerges from and is
sustained by nations acting rationally to maximize their interests); DAVID KENNEDY, THE
DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE 20-21 (2008) (arguing that the human rights movement, and NGOs
associated with it, have promoted an interventionist agenda based on Western models that
impoverishes local political discourse in developing countries).
13. For a discussion of the legitimacy and accountability of civil society organizations,
see generally the articles in the symposia on civil society organizations organized by the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, the Chicago Journal of International Law, and Chi-
cago-Kent Law School. Symposium, Governing Civil Society: NGO Accountability, Legiti-
macy and Influence, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 813, 813-1074 (2011); Symposium, Paradise Lost?
NGOs and Global Accountability, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 155, 155-206 (2002); Symposium, Legal
and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289,
289-612 (2000).
14. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Coopera-
tion and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY
GLOBALIZED WORLD 219, 220 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 2002).
15. Id. at 212.
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with international organizations as (partially) curing this democratic defi-
cit by channeling the concerns of the relevant public(s) and increasing in-
stitutional transparency.16 Others think civil society participation
exacerbates this deficit by allowing special interest groups to bypass na-
tional democratic decision-making procedures.' 7
These two strands of scholarship, however, have failed to engage di-
rectly with the varying, and often conflicting, theories about civil society.' 8
This Article seeks to fill this gap in the literature by developing a theoreti-
cal framework that provides a more fine-grained description of civil soci-
ety. I propose a typology that distinguishes civil society organizations into
their possible functions and purposes, ranging from apolitical and individ-
ualistic to policy-oriented and state-integrated. I argue that five groups of
theories of civil society, each espousing different value systems and thus
emphasizing particular functions of civil society while minimizing others,
map onto this framework: (1) market liberal; (2) civic republican and so-
cial capital; (3) Habermasian critical; (4) Third World, feminist, and minor-
ity critical; and (5) new governance and state-society synergy theories.
These distinctive theories provide strikingly different answers to funda-
mental questions, such as: Why should international organizations and na-
tional governments encourage civil society participation? Which civil
society actors should participate? Which institutional designs best foster
such participation and result in successful implementation? Does civil soci-
ety participation contribute to or detract from the legitimacy of interna-
tional organizations?
Seeing civil society through the lens of each of these theories leads to
distinct consequences for the design of international institutions and na-
tional implementation mechanisms that seek to interface with civil society.
Adoption of this theoretical framework would sharpen the debate about
16. See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing Civil Society Participa-
tion, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 891, 894 (2011) ("In my view, the value-added from NGOs on the
international plane is that they correct for the pathologies of governments and IOs [Interna-
tional Organizations]."); Anne Peters, Dual Democracy, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 263, 318 (Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) ("The legitimacy gains of NGO
involvement are apt to outweigh the legitimacy problems. Overall, a further democratization
of the international legal order requires that the participation of NGOs in law-making and
law-enforcement be strengthened.").
17. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 205, 221 (2000) (describing globalism as "a kind of worldwide cartelization of gov-
ernments and interest groups").
18. Although a few scholars have examined political science theories of civil society in
discussions about global governance and national implementation, none have reorganized
and synthesized the set of political science and sociological theories examined here. More
importantly, none have advanced the theoretical framework and typology of civil society I
describe, which identifies and illuminates conflicting, unstated conceptions of civil society as
a special problem for international governance and national implementation, allows for their
systematic analysis, and reveals divergent possible institutional designs. See, e.g., MARY
KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2003); Francesca E. Bignami, Civil Society and Interna-
tional Organizations: A Liberal Framework for Global Governance (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty-scholarship/1126.
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how civil society should interact with the state and with international orga-
nizations and what type of civil society organizations should participate in
these interactions; pinpoint shortcomings of existing institutional designs;
and expand the range of possible design options. It would do so by provid-
ing conceptual clarity and a shared language to guide policy debates, by
illuminating different understandings of civil society already implicit in
some international organizations' policies vis-A-vis civil society, and by
showing other perspectives not considered in existing institutional designs.
The theoretical framework I propose also contributes normatively to
debates regarding the legitimacy of international organizations. Whether
international organizations can legitimately constrain state action is a
question of pressing importance, as international organizations have ac-
quired increasing independence from the nation states that created
them.19 The legitimacy of international organizations is important for both
pragmatic and normative reasons. As a practical matter, belief in the legit-
imacy of international organizations is a critical element in motivating
state compliance with international law. The legitimacy of international
organizations is also important normatively to justify their increasing au-
tonomy and authority.20 Yet, traditional conceptions of what it means for
a state to be legitimate-that is, having a democratically elected govern-
ment with direct delegation and accountability relationships-do not eas-
ily translate to international organizations.21 In the absence of a global
parliament and global elections, a conception of what the legitimacy of
international organizations requires must be broader than democratic
electoral legitimacy. 22
Several scholars have postulated that civil society can play a crucial
role in the development of a theory of legitimacy for international organi-
zations.23 But procedures for civil society participation that are inattentive
to power disparities within civil society itself and inattentive to the need
for fostering the expression of all relevant interests, may paradoxically in-
crease the democratic deficit of international organizations and hinder im-
plementation. In other words, an undertheorized mechanism for civil
society participation may undermine the very legitimacy it is designed to
provide. In Part III, I rely on the theoretical framework outlined in this
Article to develop a theory of civil society-which I label inclusive-contes-
tatory-that best explains and justifies a role for civil society participation
in international lawmaking and implementation.
19. See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW MAKERS
(2005) (examining the role international organizations play in international law, multilateral
treaties, and the institutionalized dispute settlements).
20. See infra Part III.A.4.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Gov-
ernance Institutions, 20 ETHics & INT'L AFF. 405, 406 (2006); Charnovitz, supra note 16, at
894-95; Peters, supra note 16, at 313-18; see also infra Part III.B.
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My argument proceeds in three parts: Part I is diagnostic. It develops
a framework to analyze the relationships among civil society, the state,
and international organizations that classifies the functions and purposes
of civil society as inward-looking, outward-looking, or boundary-crossing.
It analyzes and maps five groups of theories of civil society onto this
framework-(1) market liberal; (2) civic republican and social capital; (3)
Habermasian critical; (4) Third World, feminist, and minority critical; and
(5) new governance and state-society synergy-exposing fundamentally
different normative understandings of civil society.24
Part II works out in more detail how choosing one theoretical inter-
pretation of civil society over another will lead to different prescriptive
outcomes. It relies on a case study of the international regime that seeks to
implement the U.N. General Assembly Declaration of Commitment on
HIV/AIDS (UNGASS). It first provides a brief overview of the global
efforts to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, focusing on the role of the
UNGASS monitoring process. It then illustrates how UNGASS provides
inconsistent definitions of civil society that reveal the lack of an underlying
analytical framework to guide policy prescriptions. It concludes by show-
ing how the five groups of theories generate distinct monitoring-regime
designs, applicable not only to UNGASS but also more broadly to many
international monitoring regimes: (1) delegation to market-ordered, apolit-
ical, private associations; (2) deference to the state; (3) participation of mi-
nority voices; (4) criticism of state action; and (5) collaboration among all
stakeholders. 25 This Part pays particular attention to civil society partici-
pation in the national implementation of international commitments. This
emphasis on implementation is driven by documented implementation
gaps in a variety of fields, including human rights law. 26
Part III relies on the theoretical framework developed in Part I to
engage normatively with the scholarly debate surrounding the legitimacy
of international organizations. I show how debates about civil society's
contribution to the legitimacy of international organizations are con-
founded by different underlying conceptions of civil society, which are sel-
dom explicitly articulated or explored. I then show how my framework can
contribute to the debate by suggesting that an outward-looking theory of
civil society, based on a capacious reading of Habermasian critical theory,
can best justify a legitimizing role for civil society participation in interna-
tional lawmaking and national implementation. This understanding of civil
24. See infra figs.1 & 2.
25. See infra tbl.1.
26. See, e.g., TODD LANDMAN, STUDYING HUMAN RiGirrs (2006); TODD LANDMAN,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2005); Oona Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002); Christof Heyns & Frans
Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23
Hum. RTs. Q. 483, 487-88 (2001). But see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the
Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L 171, 171-72 (2003) (arguing that the
empirical effect of human rights treaties show minimal, and sometimes no reduction in
human rights violations).
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society is particularly important in areas likely to engender normative dis-
agreement about the proper role of international institutions, where legiti-
macy questions are most salient.
I. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
What is civil society? The term often evokes the emancipatory move-
ments in Latin America of the 1980s and Eastern Europe of the 1990s. 27
More recently, it has been used to describe the wave of popular protests
that sparked the "Arab Spring."28 This understanding of civil society
equates civil society to social movements engaged in political opposition.
But civil society is also used to describe groups with shared interests or
identities, which effectively create cohesive ties among individuals without
any explicit political agenda. 29 Civil society may include lobbying groups
that represent powerful business interests, NGOs with international reach,
and local community associations. Political scientists and sociologists have
long grappled with this slippery concept and proposed multiple ways of
characterizing the diverse assortment of groups and interests that can be
said to make up civil society. I draw from these two fields to create a typol-
ogy of civil society that, I argue, is particularly well suited to describe and
understand the multiple ways in which international organizations have
(often implicitly) conceived of civil society. Each category in my proposed
typology corresponds to a particular theory or groups of theories of civil
society described in detail in Section E. Thus, theories of civil society can
be understood as emphasizing the different functions of civil society de-
picted in this typology. Specifically, I propose that different types of civil
society organizations range from inward-looking to outward-looking in
their purposes and effects. At one end of the spectrum, civil society is
apolitical and serves only individualistic aims. At the other, it is explicitly
political, interacting with the state to shape public policy.
A. Inward-Looking Functions of Civil Society
Inward-looking functions are directed toward the individual. They in-
clude personal psychological advantages derived from being a member of
a community; the development of an individual's identity through interac-
27. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, On Civil Society: Why Eastern Europe's Revolutions
Could Succeed, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 128, 128 (1995); Michael Foley & Bob Edwards, The Para-
dox of Civil Society, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1996, at 38, 38.
28. Arab Spring: Challenges during Political Transitions and Comparative Lessons for
Civil Societies in the Middle East and North Africa, THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE, http://gradu-
ateinstitute.ch/ccdp/ccdp-research/projects/current-projects/arabspring.html(last updated Jan.
7, 2013) (arguing that "civil society" has been in the "driving seat" of the Arab Spring).
29. The clearest articulation of this apolitical view of civil society comes from Robert
Putnam and Francis Fukuyama, who emphasize the role of civil society in building social
capital by fostering ties among individuals. Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital, Civil Society
and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 7, 11 (2001); Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65, 67.
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tions and debates about group goals and policies; the development and
adoption of a set of moral values; and the development of self-respect and
self-sufficiency. Additionally, civil society associations may foster specific
inward-looking individual qualities that tend to prepare citizens for partic-
ipation in public life, such as trust toward and cooperation with fellow
citizens. Associations that foster these qualities may lead indirectly to
higher levels of citizen engagement in public life, by "broaden[ing] partici-
pants' sense of self [and] developing the 'I' into the 'we." 30 Examples of
this associational type include voluntary civic associations such as church-
related groups, parent-teacher associations, sports groups, and fraternal
groups. What all of these inward-looking groups have in common is the
lack of an explicit political agenda that seeks to influence governmental
decisions.3 '
B. Inward-Outward Boundary Functions
At the inward-outward boundary are those instances in which civil so-
ciety has a dual role as a space for fostering both inward-looking charac-
teristics and outward-looking public discourse. For example, civil society
as a "subaltern counterpublic[ ]" (a term coined by feminist critical scholar
Nancy Fraser) functions as a space where groups with minority views not
(yet) accepted by the wider public can come together to (1) develop and
formulate their "identities, interests, and needs" (an inward-looking goal)
and (2) deliberate about and develop alternative and often contestatory
interpretations of accepted norms (an outward-looking goal).32
C. Outward-Looking Functions
Outward-looking functions are directed toward others (be it society-
at-large or a section of society). Outward-looking aspects of civil society
seek to impact opinion-formation in the realm of civil society (for exam-
ple, through public debate and media campaigns) and decision making in
the realm of the state (for example, through monitoring, criticism, and lob-
bying). In addition, they include "service" aspects of associational life. The
monitoring or watchdog role of civil society seeks to hold the state ac-
countable to its national and international commitments and to point out
those instances in which it has fallen short. Criticism entails an analysis of
30. Putnam, supra note 29, at 67; accord Fukuyama, supra note 29, at 11 (arguing that
voluntary associations of civil society that promote generalized social trust are able to instill
in individuals "the habits of cooperation that would eventually carry over into public life").
31. The groups listed typically carry out inward-looking functions. But this does not
rule out that some of these groups may be engaged in outward-looking activities at specific
time points. The functional approach described here requires an analysis of the type of activ-
ity a particular association is engaged in. See infra Part I.E.1.
32. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, Soc. TEXT, no. 25/26, 1990, at 56, 67-68 ("[S]ubaltern
counterpublics have a dual character. On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal
and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for
agitational activities directed towards wider publics."); infra Part I.E.3.
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the state's actions either through the lens of currently applicable law and
norms, or under an alternative paradigm (for example, formulated in
counterpublics). Through criticism and mobilization of public opinion and
resources, civil society can challenge existing norms or interpretative
frameworks and eventually replace them with alternative ones.33
D. Boundary-Crossing Functions
Finally, civil society could participate in decision and policy making in
collaboration with the state. In contrast, all other functions described
above situate civil society outside political life (by focusing on inward-
looking functions) or in opposition to the state (by providing alternative
interpretations of dominant norms or by serving as a check on government
power through its role as watchdog and critic). Most liberal theories of
civil society, in fact, consider that a sharp separation between the state and
civil society is necessary for the latter to maintain its independence and its
ability to represent a legitimate check on state power.34 Nevertheless, as I
explain in detail below, a boundary-crossing function is increasingly being
ascribed to civil society in critical theory and new governance scholar-
ship.35 This typology is depicted below in Figure 1:
Civil Society State











33. See infra Part I.E.2.
34. See generally Post & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 90 (explaining that a separation
between state and civil society exists); see infra Part I.E.4.
35. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic
Governance, 20 POL. & Soc'y 393, 443 (1992) (positing that the "fuller and more explicit
incorporation of groups into governance might actually enhance the exercise of popular sov-
ereignty through the traditional institutions and practices of territorial representation");
Grdinne de Bdrea, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in NEw GOVERNANCE
AND CONSTITU-rIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006).
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The typology of civil society functions described above can begin to
provide a "thicker" understanding of civil society organizations by distin-
guishing among key functions performed by different associational types.
Emphasis on particular inward- or outward-looking functions of civil soci-
ety will have consequences for institutional design. For example, interna-
tional organizations that monitor compliance with international
agreements may choose different reporting guidelines depending on
whether they are interested in (1) fostering cooperation among members
of local communities (an inward-looking function); (2) eliciting indepen-
dent, critical information to evaluate state performance (a watchdog, out-
ward-looking function); or (3) fostering close civil society-state
collaboration at the national level (a boundary-crossing, outward-looking
function). 36 The creation of thicker community ties to encourage coopera-
tion among local communities may best be fostered by encouraging indi-
vidual associations of civil society to develop their own monitoring reports
and by providing flexible reporting guidelines, in which a plurality of
means of communication is considered valid. In contrast, if the interna-
tional organization is seeking an independent and credible critique of state
reports, standardized reporting guidelines may be preferable, as they
would allow comparisons between state and civil society reports to be
made efficiently. Additionally, in this situation, reports by national NGOs
with both technical expertise and a solid reputation may provide the most
reliable information to evaluate state performance. Finally, fostering close
collaboration between civil society and the state may require the prepara-
tion of a single report to be presented internationally and the development
of mechanisms to ensure a broad national consultation process. 37 I explore
in more detail the consequences of emphasizing particular functions of
civil society for the design of monitoring and implementation regimes with
the aid of a case study in Part II.
While this analytical framework provides a useful tool to classify dif-
ferent civil society organizations, it cannot answer which types of civil soci-
ety organizations should engage with international organizations and
national governments in international lawmaking and implementation, or
how they should do so. The following Section engages with normative the-
ories of civil society that map onto this framework and provide support for
emphasizing specific functions of civil society over others.
E. Theories of Civil Society
All democratic perspectives of civil society share some fundamental
assumptions. They all agree that civil society and the state represent two
realms that are in opposition but also interdependent. 38 They are in oppo-
36. See infra Part II.C.2.
37. See infra Part II.C.2.
38. See, e.g., Post & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 11 (arguing that civil society and
government are in productive tension, because while there must always exist a boundary
between them, "civil society requires government to survive, and government, at least demo-
cratic government, draws deeply from the strengths of civil society").
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sition because civil society fosters the development of different individual
and group identities, based on a variety of moral conceptions of the good
life, while the state is the realm of shared norms and identities that reflect
society's common purposes or compromises. Because of this oppositional
relationship, civil society and the state can also pose a threat to each other.
Civil society can undermine public discourse about the common good and
efforts to reach compromises when particularist groups impose their own
conceptions of the good life by capturing state mechanisms of norm crea-
tion and enforcement.39 This can happen, for example, if groups repre-
senting dominant economic, religious, or ethnic interests come to
dominate governmental policy making, conflating the "common good"
with the interests of that particular group. Conversely, the government
threatens the plurality of civil society if it seeks to impose a uniform con-
ception of the good life on all civil society associations. Imposed conver-
gence on a single common purpose flowing from this conception can pave
the way to totalitarianism by eroding the realm of civil society as a space
where alternative or novel ways of life can be developed and tested.40 But
civil society and the democratic state also depend on each other, as both a
plurality of identities and shared purposes (or compromises) are essential
to the creation of a legitimate democratic government. 41 Beyond these ar-
eas of agreement, however, theories of civil society differ sharply in their
conceptualization of the proper role of civil society, including how it
should interact with state institutions.
The following sections engage with five theories of civil society. For
each theory I analyze how it maps onto a distinct portion of the function-
based typology introduced above thus providing support for emphasizing
particular functions of civil society over others. I begin to explore how
each theory provides different answers to which types of civil society orga-
nizations should engage in international lawmaking and implementation,
and how they should do so. I also engage with key criticisms.
1. Inward-Looking Theories: Market Liberal and Social
Capital/Civic Republican Theories
a. Market Liberal Theory
Loren Lomasky provides the flagship definition of civil society
adopted by market liberals; he defines civil society as "the realm of volun-
tary association that stands between the individuals . . . and the state." 42
39. See, e.g., id. ("Government's claim that it is not simply the mirror and agent of the
most powerful forces in society must be credible.").
40. See Post & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 16 (discussing Hannah Arendt's character-
ization of totalitarianism "as the end point of unremitting congruence"). Thus, to remain
legitimate, democratic governments cannot simply be "the mirror and agent of the most pow-
erful forces in society." Id. at 11. A pluralist civil society is a precondition for democratic
decision making. Id.
41. See, e.g., Post & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 11.
42. Loren Lomasky, Classical Liberalism and Civil Society, in ALTERNATIVE CONCEP-
TIONS OF CIVIL SOcIETY 50, 50 (Simone Chambers & Will Kymlicka eds., 2002).
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Market liberals construct a dualistic model of civil society that places all
voluntary associations in opposition to the state. 43 Market liberals empha-
size the values of choice, liberty and efficiency. In this context, competitive
markets are a crucial component of civil society because they function as a
mechanism that coordinates social interests based on individual choice.44
The market functions as the main engine of human flourishing, enabling
individuals to pursue their self-interest, become self-sufficient, and "take
responsibility for their lives and to develop meaningful social roles."45 Be-
cause they prioritize economic aspects of social life, market liberal theo-
ries emphasize associations that promote the inward-looking goals of self-
reliance and responsibility. Thus, market liberals consider associations of
civil society outside the political realm, where individuals come together
for personal reasons, as vital places where individuals have a chance to be
free and flourish. 46
In contrast to a civil society organized around market competition,
which is imagined as the realm where human flourishing can and does take
place, the state, according to market liberals, is best kept in the back-
ground.47 Because the government holds the power of coercion, limiting
governmental expansion is crucial to securing individual liberties. Thus,
the role of the state is limited to enforcing the coercive mechanisms neces-
sary to "secure a framework that encourages productive competition
within the private sector." 48 There is a strong presumption against affirma-
tive state action, rebuttable only if "the regulatory means are minimally
restrictive of choice, and if they can reasonably be expected to work a
substantial improvement in the general welfare." 49
43. Steven Scalet & David Schmidtz, State, Civil Society, and Classical Liberalism, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 26.
44. See, e.g., Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 398 (describing choice and liberty as
the core values in U.S. neoliberal constitutionalism).
45. Scalet & Schmidtz, supra note 43, at 34.
46. Id. at 30.
47. See id. (characterizing civil society as constituting the forefront, and the state the
background, of classical liberal theory).
48. Richard B. Miller, Overview: The Virtues and Vices of Civil Society, in CIVIL SoCI-
ETY AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 370, 383 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 399. Market liberals support governmental pro-
vision of services (or governmental regulation of services provided by private firms) in some
situations of market failure, understood as the failure of a system of price-market institutions
to lead to Paretian efficiency, that is a situation in which it is impossible to make anyone
better off without making someone else worse off. Classical examples are governmental pro-
vision of public goods (or governmental intervention to foster the private creation of public
goods), for example through intellectual property rights, and governmental intervention
when imperfect information prevents the public as customers from making informed choices,
for example through overseeing and regulating testing of pharmaceutical products. See gener-
ally, Francis Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958) (discussing
market failures within different types of regulatory models); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward
M. lacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003) (discussing
motivational benefits that private firms have over public sector counterparts, resulting in
increased efficiency in some sectors). Nevertheless, market failure alone is insufficient to
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Market liberals justify governmental restraints on individual choice
and liberty only when necessary to protect the very existence of these val-
ues. In this context, market liberals decry the affirmative state as cor-
rupting voluntary associations by encouraging rent-seeking behavior by
organized interests. That is, when particular civil society organizations are
able to use the affirmative power of the state to secure special advantages
(which are subsidized by the public purse), state policies come to be de-
fined by the agendas of special interest groups.50 In turn, special interest
politics lead to decreased efficiency. Efficiency losses take place because
political activity "divert[s] the energy of citizens away from economically
productive contributions,"5 and because governments are not as sensitive
as private actors to poor performance. 52 For this reason, market liberals
are "inclined to define civil society in terms of private associations, and to
ignore or be skeptical about associations involved in political advocacy."5
Market liberals are generally skeptical of organizations involved in politi-
cal advocacy (or "special interest groups") because the process of political
organization and advocacy is thought to produce inefficiencies both by di-
verting energies from economically productive activities and by using the
public purse to subsidize a group's private aims. 54 Partly because of this
justify government intervention, because market liberals argue that political action is often
likely to lead to greater inefficiencies. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
Political Solutions to Market Problems, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 417, 417 (1981).
50. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL OR-
DER OF A FREE PEOPLE 13-15 (1979).("[The] domination of government by coalitions of
organized interests [is] . . . . the inescapable result of a system in which government has
unlimited powers to take whatever measures are required to satisfy the wishes of those on
whose support it relies."); see also Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 404.
51. Cohen & Rogers, supra note 32, at 401-02.
52. See Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 49, at 1436-39. Trebilock and lacobucci
argue that governments are likely inefficient providers of goods and services even when the
goal of these services is not profit-maximization but rather other, public purposes (such as
educating students on the virtues of citizenship). This is because governments are "insulat[ed]
from the risk of failure," id. at 1439, while other private actors (be it for-profit or nonprofit
entities) have "incentives to perform well to ensure their organization's survival and retain
their employment." Id. at 1436. As a consequence, the competitive provision of services by
nonstate actors is generally preferred. If the desired goal is not profit-maximization, it is
more efficient for the state to set performance standards and allow competition among differ-
ent providers than to provide the service itself. Id. at 1437.
53. Will Kymlicka, Civil Society and Government: A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 83. Market liberals also view positively
those apolitical, voluntary, nonprofit associations that focus on service provision, because
these organizations are likely to curtail the expansion of the welfare state. See FRIEDRICK A.
HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 150-52 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Loren Lomasky, Classical Liberalism and Civil Society, in ALTERNATIVE
CONCEPTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY (Simone Chambers & Will Kymlicka eds., 2002). Market
liberals object particularly to civil society associations that seek to use the public purse to
subsidize their own economic activities and to interfere with the operation of the free market,
such as business associations that engage in restrictive market practices. They do not object
to those civil society organizations with educative or coordinating functions that do not at-
tempt to use public funds to subsidize their own activities and that act "in ways consistent
with a commitment to a minimal state." See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 400.
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focus on securing individualistic aims, a market liberal theory is unable to
imagine a role for civil society groups engaged in political advocacy that
will not devolve into factional politics.
Market liberals' distrust of most affirmative state policies stems
largely from the primacy they bestow on the values of choice and individ-
ual liberty. Other theories of civil society, however, dispute the superiority
of these two values and support state intervention, even at the price of
inefficiency, when it furthers a different set of values such as political
equality or distributive justice.55 Market liberals' conceptualization of in-
dividuals as producers and consumers also risks the erosion of their iden-
tity as members of political or cultural communities. 56 By contrast, social
capital and civic republican theories, which I turn to in the next section,
seek to foster individuals' shared identities as community members, which
they view as crucial to developing and sustaining a democratic
government.
b. Social Capital Theory57
The development of the theory of social capital owes much to Alexis
de Tocqueville's insight that Americans combatted the excessive individu-
alism generated by modern democracy by forming and engaging in volun-
tary associations.58 Tocqueville credited civic associations in America with
serving as the "schools of democracy" that sustained a vibrant democratic
government. 59 To Tocqueville, associational life that fostered public vir-
tues such as trust and reciprocity served as a check on the atomistic ten-
dencies of modern society. 60
55. See Kymlicka, supra note 53, at 80.
56. Michael Walzer made a similar argument in his lecture at the University of Stock-
holm. Michael Walzer, Gunnar Myrdal Lecture at University of Stockholm: The Civil Society
Argument 4 (Oct. 1990), available at http://cts.lub.1u.se/ojs/index.php/st/article/viewFile/2863/
2427 (arguing that "autonomy in the marketplace provides no support for social solidarity").
57. I focus on the theory of social capital as developed and popularized by political
scientists Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ROBERT
LEONARDI & RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1994); Fukuyama, supra note 29.
58. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 119 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d
ed. 1863) (explaining how democracy engenders individualism: "thus not only does democ-
racy make every man forget his ancestors, but it . . . throws him back forever upon himself
alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart.");
Id. at 129 (explaining the crucial role of associations in combatting individualism: "feelings
and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed, only by
the reciprocal influence of men upon one another. I have shown that these influences are
almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this can
only be accomplished by associations." Cf Putnam, supra note 29, at 65 (discussing Toc-
queville's impressions of American civic associations).
59. See Wayne Norman & Will Kymlicka, Citizenship, in A COMPANION To APPLIED
ETHICS 210, 215-16 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2003) (explaining how
Tocqueville saw "the associations in civil society as 'schools of democracy,' teaching the vir-
tues of public-spiritedness, cooperation, and civility").
60. Id.
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Modern social capital theorists echo Tocqueville's central thesis that
"democracy itself depends on active engagement by citizens in community
affairs." 61 Social capital theory is an empirical effort, within a civic repub-
lican framework, to understand the mechanisms through which civic en-
gagement and social connectedness strengthen democratic norms and
institutions. 62 One of the leading proponents of the importance of social
capital for long-lasting and effective democratic governance, Robert Put-
nam, defines social capital as "features of social organization such as net-
works, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation
for mutual benefit." 63 Importantly, because the norms that constitute so-
cial capital are norms of trust and reciprocity that lead to cooperation in
groups, they are "related to traditional virtues like honesty, the keeping of
commitments, reliable performance of duties, [and] reciprocity."64
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti argue that civic associations contribute
to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government "both because
of their 'internal' effects on individual members and because of their 'ex-
ternal' effects on the wider polity."6 5 In other words, those associations
that inculcate in their members "skills of cooperation as well as a sense of
shared responsibility for collective endeavors," 66 will produce spill-over
effects in society at large, giving rise to a citizenry that has both the tools
and the motivation necessary to engage in public life.6 7
Because relationships of trust, reciprocity and responsibility require
repeated, face-to-face interactions among group members engaged in a
common goal, social capital theorists emphasize local community organi-
61. See Robert D. Putnam & Kristin A. Goss, Introduction, in DEMOCRACIES IN FLUX
1, 6 (Robert D. Putnam ed., 2003); accord PUTNAM, LEONARDI & NANETTI, supra note 57, at
11 (acknowledging that Tocqueville's emphasis on civic associations as key depositories of
civic virtue "play a central role in our analysis").
62. Social capital theorist Robert Putnam explicitly places his experimental research
program within a civic republican framework. PUTNAM, LEONARDI & NANETII, supra note
57, at 87 ("[Civic republicanism] contains the seeds for a theory of effective democratic gov-
ernance. . . .We want to explore empirically whether the success of a democratic government
depends on the degree to which its surroundings approximate the ideal of a 'civic
community'.").
63. Putnam, supra note 29, at 67.
64. Fukuyama, supra note 29, at 7-8.
65. PUTNAM, LEONARDI & NANETTI, supra note 57, at 89.
66. Id.; accord Putnam, supra note 29, at 73 ("Members of associations are much more
likely than nonmembers to participate in politics, to spend time with neighbors, to express
social trust .... ).
67. Nancy Rosenblum has labeled this understanding of civil society the "mediating
association" approach. Rosemblum uses the term "mediating" to convey the idea that the
"moral dispositions" and "social capital" generated in social networks are transferred to and
benefit political society as a whole unintentionally and without government action. NANCY L.
ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA
41 (1998).
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zations as the preeminent locus of social capital. 68 The common goal that
brings participants together need not be political. In fact, Putnam's re-
search showed that the best predictor of good government in Italy was
choral societies, soccer clubs, and co-operatives-all inward-looking,
apolitical associations.69 Further, some types of explicitly political groups
contribute only negligibly to social capital because they do not foster the
type of social connectedness that is crucial to the development of civic
virtues among its members.70 Thus, politically oriented membership orga-
nizations-whose roster may count thousands of dues-paying members
linked only by their shared concerns (for the environment, for women's
rights, etc.) but unaware of each other's existence-do not produce the
type of connections that generate social capital. The same is true of large
apolitical NGOs such as Oxfam, whose numerous donors are connected
only by their belief in the NGO's mission.
Social capital theorists' emphasis on local community networks relies
on "small moral worlds" to create, sustain, and improve the nation.71 So-
cial capital theory is inward-looking precisely because it considers self-reg-
ulation and small-scale interpersonal relations as a prerequisite for
effective democratic governance. 72
Community associations that foster qualities of trust and cooperation
among their members need not necessarily benefit the wider community,
however, and may in fact be detrimental to it. For example, close-knit
groups may be hostile to those they view as outsiders.73 To account and
correct for this criticism, social capital theorists postulate that two types of
social capital are required for effective democratic governance: bonding
social capital (creating in-group bonds) and bridging social capital (creat-
68. See Robert D. Putnam, What Makes Democracy Work?, IPA REV., no. 1, 1994, at
31, 34 (arguing that "[i]nvestments in the portfolio of social capital must occur at the local
level").
69. Id. ("[W]hat best predicted good government in the Italian regions was choral soci-
eties, soccer clubs and co-operatives. . . . Communities don't have choral societies because
they are wealthy; they are wealthy because they have choral societies-or more precisely, the
traditions of engagement, trust and reciprocity that choral societies symbolize."); see also
PUTrrNAM, LEONARDI & NANErl, supra note 57, at 90 (emphasizing that promoting social
capital does not "require that the manifest purpose of the association be political. Taking part
in a choral society or a bird watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for
the joys of successful collaboration").
70. Putnam, supra note 29, at 70 (arguing that new mass-membership organizations
such as the Sierra Club, while of great political importance, are not as important in generat-
ing social capital as local organizations where members interact face-to-face with each other
because the ties among members in mass-membership organizations "are to common sym-
bols, common leaders, and perhaps common ideals, but not to one another").
71. ROSENBLUM, supra note 67, at 41 (citing Alan Silver, The Curious Importance of
Small Groups in American Sociology, in SOCIOLOGY IN AMERICA 70 (Herbert J. Gans ed.,
1990)).
72. Id. at 41-42.
73. See, e.g., Fukuyama, supra note 29, at 8 ("Many groups achieve internal cohesion
at the expense of outsiders, who can be treated with suspicion, hostility or outright hatred.").
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ing bonds across groups).74 Bridging social capital is strengthened by indi-
vidual membership in a plurality of associations, which bridges potentially
divisive differences.75 Membership in multiple groups with different goals
and aspirations is predicted to moderate extreme views as a result of cross-
pressure from groups with different views. 76
Social capital theorists share with market liberals their emphasis on
inward-looking functions of civil society but focus on different sets of in-
ward-looking qualities. To market liberals, the focus is on the individualis-
tic values of self-reliance, liberty and choice. To social capital theorists, the
focus is on the virtues of sociability, responsibility, and cooperation that
provide individuals with both the tools to engage successfully in public life
(for example, by teaching members how to participate in reasoned deliber-
ation and how to reach consensus) and the willingness to do so. In contrast
to market liberals, who view the market as a place where individuals can
flourish, social capital theories tend to regard market interactions as erod-
ing individuals' ability to develop their identities as citizens and partici-
pants in collective projects.7 7 Citizens as consumers will lack the ability to
understand citizenship as social solidarity and thus the willingness to coop-
erate toward shared goals. This difference in focus can also be framed as a
difference in unit of analysis: while market liberals prioritize the individual
consumer or producer and his or her ambitions, social capital theorists
prioritize the ties among members of a community or social network.
Both market liberal and social capital theories de-emphasize politi-
cally motivated associations that seek to directly influence state policy.
Market liberals do so explicitly, motivated by their fear that groups organ-
ized for political motives will either capture state mechanisms of coercion
and impose their vision of the good life on society at large, or use public
dollars to fund the interests of their group members. Social capital theo-
rists minimize the importance of politically-inspired associations indirectly.
They do so by celebrating dense interpersonal relations, and emphasizing
the importance of local social networks that instill the virtues of civility,
reciprocity, and cooperation.
Social capital theory seeks to address empirically one aspect of civic
republican theory-the importance of "civic virtue" for democratic gov-
ernance. But it does not have a developed theory of the state that can
guide decisions on how the state should interact with civil society. Civic
74. See id.
75. See Putnam & Goss, supra note 61, at 11.
76. See, e.g., PUTNAM, LEONARDI & NANETrI, supra note 57, at 90; Fukuyama, supra
note 29, at 9-10.
77. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 68, at 106 ("Compared with earlier generations, we
are less engaged with one another outside the marketplace and thus less prepared to cooper-
ate for shared goals. This decline in social capital helps explain the economic and political
troubles of our own democracy.").
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republican theory, however, analyzed in the next section, can fill this
gap.78
c. Civic Republican Theory
Civic republicans see the state as a force for advancing the common
good. In contrast to market liberals, who seek compromise rather than
consensus over social goals and values, 79 civic republicans are committed
to agreement on precisely what the common good requires. While ac-
knowledging that agreement may not be possible on all political issues,
they maintain "the possibility of settling at least some normative disputes
with substantively right answers."80
According to civic republican theory, consensus on what constitutes
the common good requires public-regarding deliberation in political insti-
tutions.81 Deliberation is public-regarding when political actors justify
their choices by appealing to a broader public good, not to their own pri-
vate interests.82 Additionally, the process of rational deliberation can only
take place if political equality eliminates "sharp disparities in political par-
ticipation or influence among individuals or social groups,"83 and if groups
and individuals share a commitment to consensus as a regulative ideal.84
Thus, although private interests inform the deliberative process, decision
making is not merely a compromise among warring factions. Rather, it is
an exercise in rational decision making about the common good. When
deliberation is inclusive of all views, articulated as rational arguments
about public needs and wants, affirmative state action is legitimized as re-
sulting from social consensus about what the common good requires in a
particular situation.
Public-regarding deliberation requires individuals to come together as
citizens. Citizens, as opposed to subjects of an authoritarian regime, par-
ticipate in government with "independence of mind and judgment," and
possess "civic virtue," or a general concern for the public good.85 As dis-
cussed above, to social capital theorists, civic virtue is generated and sus-
78. I address prescriptions derived from social capital and civic republican theory, as
well as criticisms to these approaches, in the next section.
79. Market liberals are profoundly skeptical of "people's capacities to communicate
persuasively to one another their diverse normative experiences: of needs and rights, values
and interests, and, more broadly, interpretations of the world.. . . in ways that move each
other's views on disputed normative issues toward felt (not merely strategic) agreement with-
out deception, coercion, or other manipulation." Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493, 1507 (1988) (describing modern pluralist political science understanding of the po-
litical process as "insuperably private-regarding or strategic") (emphasis in original).
80. Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1550.
83. See id. at 1541.
84. See id. at 1550.
85. Id. at 1551; see also WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: Gooos, VIRTUES,
AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 221-24 (1991).
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tained in dense, local networks within civil society where individuals can
learn the virtues of sociability, responsibility, respect for others, and coop-
eration. Similarly, contemporary civic republican theorists recognize the
importance of private associations as "seedbeds of virtue" that prepare
citizens for engagement in politics. 86 For example, Michael Sandel has em-
phasized the importance of institutions such as townships, schools, reli-
gions, and "virtue-sustaining occupations" in "form[ing] the 'character of
mind' and 'habits of the heart' a democratic republic requires."87 Frank
Michelman's version of civic republicanism considers that citizenship is ex-
ercised both in the realm of politics and through civic associations that are
not directly involved in party politics or in efforts to lobby the state, which
can create community and provide citizens with the "direct experience of
self-revisionary, dialogic engagement."88
Civic republican theory prescribes affirmative state action in the realm
of civil society. Specifically, civic republicans tend to endorse measures
that foster the creation, proliferation, and survival of those civil society
organizations that foster in their members the qualities of character that
civic republican theories deem necessary for the common good of self-
government. 9 Thus, much like social capital theorists, civic republicans
prize those inward-looking institutions of civil society that can serve as
"private boot camps for citizenship" 90 by inculcating in their members the
86. See generally SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND
CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995).
87. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 320-21 (1996).
88. Michelman's version of civic republicanism appears to view civil society similarly
to critical feminist and Third World theorists. That is, civil society is prized as a realm where
contestatory versions of what constitutes the common good are dialogically developed. For
example, Michelman emphasizes that "[u]nderstandings of the social world that are con-
tested and shaped in the daily encounters and transactions of civil society at large . . . are ...
to be counted among the sources and channels of republican self-government and jurisgener-
ative politics." Michelman, supra note 79, at 1531; cf. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1542 (argu-
ing that although "[c]itizenship often occurs in nominally private spheres . . . its primary
importance is in governmental processes"). But see Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow Republican-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1721 (1987) (questioning whether Michelman's view of civil society
associations as speakers in a non state-centered republican dialogue is consonant with civic
republican theory). Michelman, however, differs from critical feminist and Third World theo-
rists, first, in that he places deliberation among members of the judiciary as the key means by
which those marginal voices of civil society interact with the state to shape its policies. Sec-
ond, Michelman's depiction of voluntary associations as participants in a common public life
is somewhat at odds with feminist and critical scholars' understanding of civil society as
spaces of regroupment, introspection, and opposition to dominant norms. See infra Part
I.E.3. (discussing critical feminist and Third World theories of civil society).
89. See SANDEL, supra note 87, at 25; see also, Michael Walzer, The Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 17 (1990) (noting that associations of civil society
are unlikely to be self-sustaining in modern society, and emphasizing a role for the state in
nurturing the formation and maintenance of community organizations).
90. Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1721 (noting that civic republicans tend to value private,
voluntary associations insofar as they function as "private boot camps for citizenship" where
"greater participation, feelings of attachment, and common commitment" are taught).
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importance of participation, attachment, and commitment to the common
good over self-serving interests.
Although public deliberation and participation in government by
civic-minded citizens are central tenets of civic republican theory, civic
republicans remain skeptical of civil society associations organized for lob-
bying and political advocacy for the same reasons as market liberals. 9 ' Be-
cause groups can have hierarchical and unequal internal structures, lack
transparency regarding decision-making procedures, and impose condi-
tions on policy makers that benefit that particular group at the expense of
society at large, civic republicans seek to save public deliberation from the
influence of special interest groups.92 Thus, civic republican theories gen-
erally propose institutional reforms that attempt to shield arenas of public
deliberation from direct group influence.93 For example, some civic repub-
lican proposals have focused on sharply delineating, in order to
strengthen, particular areas of state power to enhance the ability of politi-
cal institutions to promote rational deliberation. Cass Sunstein maintains
deliberative politics should take place in legislatures; 94 Frank Michelman,
on the other hand, places the locus of deliberative politics in the judicial
branch.95
91. See SANDEL, supra note 87, at 131 (observing that classical republicans such as
James Madison sought to disempower special interest groups "so that disinterested statesmen
might govern unhindered by them"); Michael Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary
Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1653 (1988) (remarking that "[in general,
the most important structural goal [of civic republicans] appears to be political insulation");
Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1549-50 (noting that intermediate organizations can themselves be
a source of oppression in the private realm and emphasizing that "the antonym of delibera-
tion is the imposition of outcomes by self-interested and politically powerful private groups,"
and to prevent the influence of interest groups in law-making, republicans "may well attempt
to insulate political actors from private pressure and they may also favor judicial review de-
signed to promote political deliberation and perhaps to invalidate laws when deliberation has
not occurred.").
92. Fitts, supra note 91, at 1652.
93. See id.; see also Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 406 (describing the civic repub-
lican strategy of "insulation" as aiming to "strengthen institutions, alternative to secondary
association, that have the capacity to consider and act on the common good and to encourage
those holding power within such institutions to engage in just such consideration and
action").
94. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1539; cf Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New
Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421 (1987) (arguing that deliberative politics should take place in
the regulatory process and attributing regulatory failures to the lack thereof).
95. According to Michelman, a civic republican understanding of citizens as self-rulers
and law-abiders requires citizens to be able to challenge and re-shape the conception of the
common good that underlies dominant understandings of law. Michelman, supra note 79, at
1503, 1526-27. Michelman considers that alternative interpretations of what the common
good requires often originate in minority voices, which come together as "emergently self-
conscious social groups" in the realm of civil society. Id. at 1529. It is in civil society where
marginalized groups engage in dialogue that can potentially transform mainstream under-
standings of law. A pluralist civic-republican tradition thus requires the "constant reach for
inclusion of the other, of the hitherto excluded." Id. Michelman grants a preeminent role to
judges as interpreters and evaluators of whether these "voices from the margin" make valid
re-interpretative claims of what the common good requires. Id. at 1537.
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Civic republicans and market liberals differ markedly in the processes
and institutions considered crucial for human flourishing. Market liberals
defend the primacy of a minimally-regulated marketplace where individu-
als can pursue their self-interested aims. Civic republicans emphasize pub-
lic deliberation isolated from group influence, and the preeminence of
those civil society associations that foster republican dialogue and civic
virtue.
A powerful criticism of civic republicanism is that consensus on what
the common good requires presupposes and depends upon a sufficiently
undifferentiated civil society in which such consensus is indeed possible. In
other words, pluralism may preclude the pursuit of consensus. 96 In a plu-
ralist society, public deliberation about the common good may lead either
to the exclusion of minority voices from public debate and the imposition
of majority conceptions of the common good, or to compromise rather
than consensus among a plurality of participants with largely irreconcila-
ble views. Contemporary civic republican theorists have proposed inter-
pretations of the republican tradition that defend plurality as an important
feature of civic republicanism. Proposals range from focusing on republi-
can deliberation at the local level-where consensus is likely more easily
achieved than at the national level 97-to ensuring group representation at
the national level98 and opening avenues for citizen contestation of legisla-
tive, administrative, and judicial decisions. 99
Additionally, neither social capital theory nor civic republican theory
sufficiently explains how civic virtue generated in the realm of civil society
transfers to the realm of the state. Social capital itself is often empirically
measured by assessing the level of trustfulness in a society, using survey
96. This critique has been wielded both by market liberals, who envision the political
process as a series of compromises among a plurality of self-regarding interests, and by femi-
nist, Third World and minority critical theorists, who see consensus decision-making as con-
cealing the informal oppression of marginalized groups. For a description of the market
liberal position, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT 171-188 (1962). For a description of the critical perspective, see generally,
Chantal Mouffe, Democracy, Power and the "Political", in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 245, 250-52 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996);
see also John S. Dryzek & Simon Niemeyer, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political
Ideals, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 634 (2006) (describing the tension between the political values of
consensus and pluralism); infra Part I.E.3.
97. See Walzer, supra note 89, at 20 (characterizing republicanism as "an integrated
and unitary doctrine in which energy and commitment are focused primarily on the political
realm," but postulating that the civic republican doctrine "can be extended to account for a
'republic of republics,' a decentralized and participatory revision of liberal democracy").
98. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1542.
99. See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 167-172 (2001) (emphasizing
that the perils of elite manipulation, faction or corruption can be remedied by "editorial"
control through contestatory democracy: establishing minorities' powers of challenge to force
public review of contestable decisions in impartial settings, setting up advisory community
bodies, carrying out participatory hearings and inquiries prior to passing legislation, and pub-
lishing proposed legislation prior to approval).
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data from the World Values Studies and association membership.100 Theo-
ries that seek to attribute high levels of citizen participation in government
to the high levels of trust arising from face-to-face interactions in civil soci-
ety organizations can thus be circular and incapable of establishing a chain
of causation. In other words, "a group's success is attributed to its social
capital, but social capital is measured by group success."' 0 Without un-
derstanding this process, it is unclear that a program designed to increase
associational density in civil society will lead to greater cooperation with
and participation in government. 102
A third important critique of civic republican theory is that it con-
ceives of civil society in merely instrumental terms. In other words, be-
cause civic republicans prioritize deliberation in the public, universal
sphere of government, they tend to view private associations as valuable
only insofar as they can aid deliberation in government. Social capital the-
orists hold a similarly instrumental view of private associations: their
worth derives from their ability to generate social capital. Social capital, in
turn, is valuable because it ultimately ensures the ability of citizens to
work cooperatively in the public sphere of government. Neither approach
emphasizes a role for civil society in developing individual identities, or
acting as a watchdog or critic. It is precisely on this oppositional role of
civil society that outward-looking theories, examined in the next section,
focus.
2. Outward-Looking Theories: Habermasian Critical Theory
Unlike market liberals and many civic republicans, who tend to focus
exclusively on the relationship between civil society and the state,
Habermasian critical theory focuses more explicitly on the relationship be-
tween civil society and both the state and the market economy.103 This
distinction is tightly linked to Jurgen Habermas' division between
100. See Peter Knorringa & Irene van Staveren, Beyond Social Capital: A Critical Ap-
proach, 65 REV. Soc. ECON. 1 (2007).
101. Id. at 5 (citing Steven N. Durlauf, On the Empirics of Social Capital, ECON. J., Nov.
2002, at F459, F459-79); see also Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applica-
tions in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. Soc. 1, 19 (1998) ("As a property of communities
and nations rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and an effect. It
leads to positive outcomes, . . . and its existence is inferred from the same outcomes. Cities
that are well governed and moving ahead economically do so because they have high social
capital; poorer cities lack in this civic virtue.").
102. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 67, at 43. Rosenblum argues that "[T]here is the
tendency to adopt a simplistic 'transmission belt' model of civil society, which says that the
beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another." Id. at 48.
Therefore, "[w]ithout a plausible dynamic, the idea of mediating institutions rests on little
more than an optimistic 'liberal expectancy."' Id. at 43.
103. See Jirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21, 28 (Seyla Benhabib
ed., 1996) ("[C]ivil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain
as distinct from the economic system as from the administration."); see also Simone Cham-
bers, A Critical Theory of Civil Society, in ALTERNATIVE CONCEFTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 90,
92-96 (Simone Chambers & Will Kymlicka eds., 2002).
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"lifeworld" and "system."1 04 To Habermas, the lifeworld is the informal
realm of society containing all those activities and institutions that are or-
ganized around communicative acts.105 In the realm of the lifeworld, indi-
viduals interact with each other to create moral and practical knowledge,
that is, to create, interpret, criticize, and transmit meaning.106 Civil society
is located in the lifeworld: it is composed of all associations and institu-
tions in which individuals interact with each other through communicative
acts designed to create such moral and practical knowledge. 107
Moral and practical knowledge, instantiated in the lifeworld, stands in
opposition to instrumental and strategic knowledge, instantiated in the
realm of "system."' 08 The latter constrains individual action based on in-
strumental and strategic imperatives and does not engage in communica-
tive action to develop and clarify valid norms.109 Both the state and the
market are systemic insofar as they coordinate individual activity through
the medium of authorized power or by the imperative of profit-making.110
State power is hierarchical and coercive, while communication in civil soci-
ety is egalitarian and persuasive. The rationality of the market emphasizes
profit-making and efficiency, while the rationality of civil society empha-
sizes the production and transmission of meaning."'
Thus, differentiating civil society from both the state and the market
helps to clarify different modes of organization characteristic of each
realm: civil society is organized around communicative interactions, the
state around bureaucratic routine and authorized power, and the market
around profit imperatives. Most importantly, however, by placing civil so-
ciety in opposition to the market economy, Habermasian critical theory
emphasizes that it is not only the state that can pose a threat to the auton-
omy of civil society. Rather, the ability of civil society to critique dominant
norms is eroded when institutions of civil society cease to be organized
around communication and debate and begin to be organized around
profit making. To Habermasian critical scholars, autonomous deliberation
104. See JORGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACrION:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 153-97 (Thomas McCar-
thy trans., 1987).
105. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 103, at 92 ("The lifeworld is made up of meanings.
We are connected to it via our interpretations and understandings. It is transmitted, altered,
and reproduced via communication.").
106. Id.
107. JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREw ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 429
(1992) ("It is ... on the institutional level of the lifeworld, that one can root a ... concept of
civil society.").
108. Chambers, supra note 103, at 90.
109. HABERMAS, supra note 104, at 154.
110. Id. ("[I1n modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which
social relations are regulated only via money and power.").
111. These definitions of civil society, state, and market are highly stylized, and critical
theorists recognize that all three coordinating logics (communication, power, and profit-mak-
ing) co-exist in the realms of the state, market, and civil society. Nevertheless, they serve to
identify dominant modes of coordination in each one of the three realms.
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is at the heart of civil society: both the market and the state can undermine
civil society by threatening "the ways in which we interact" in civil
society.112
Although Habermasian critical theorists include in their definition of
civil society the type of apolitical private associations prized by market
liberal, social capital, and civic republican theorists, they prioritize those
associations that can criticize state political institutions, offer alternative
interpretations of dominant norms, and generally "perceive, interpret, and
present society-wide problems."11 3 In practice, this means that critical the-
orists are largely interested in outward-looking associations of civil society
that are expressly political, that is, that seek to take active part in delibera-
tions about the common good and to both criticize and influence lawmak-
ing and enforcement by state entities.114 Deliberation about common
affairs takes place in the "public sphere"-a space within civil society ac-
cessible to anyone. The public sphere is both a broad normative ideal for
all societies and an empirical reality in democratic states-that tends to
fall short of the normative ideal. It requires that: (1) it be open to all who
wish to participate; (2) it be autonomous from both the state and the mar-
ket; (3) participants bracket their inequalities and deliberate as equals re-
lying on the public use of reason; and (4) participants debate the common
good, leaving aside their private interests and issues." 5
This emphasis on outward-looking associations of civil society stems
from the essential role ascribed by critical theorists to institutions of civil
society in maintaining a legitimate democratic state. An autonomous civil
society that is open to all, and in which rational deliberation among equals
about the common good takes place, can critically evaluate and analyze
state policy to expose arbitrary state action, unjustified or insufficiently
justified policies, or underlying assumptions or ideologies behind domi-
nant norms. Thus, a politically-oriented civil society preserves democracy
by ensuring that the state gives reasons for its policies that can survive
critical scrutiny in the public sphere.
112. Chambers, supra note 103, at 94.
113. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMs 358 (Willam Rehg trans.,
1996).
114. Habermas considers the "network of associations that institutionalizes problem-
solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public
spheres," to be at the "core of civil society." Id. at 367. Thus, it is those politically-oriented
associations that organize to debate issues of common concern that take center stage in
Habermasian critical theory.
115. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCrURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE 27, 30, 36-37 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THE PUBLIC
SPHERE] (explaining the development of the public sphere in the political realm); see also
Jirgen Habermas, "Reasonable" versus "True" or the Morality of World-views, in THE IN-
CLUSION OF THE OTHER 75, 86 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo de Greiff eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Habermas, Morality of World-Views] ("Anything valid should also be capable of a public
justification. Valid statements deserve the acceptance of everyone for the same reasons.")
(emphasis added).
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Critical theory's emphasis on a discursive model of civil society, where
individuals come together to debate common affairs, has much in common
with civic republican theories of public-regarding deliberation in political
institutions. In particular, both theories emphasize the importance of ra-
tional deliberation about the common good and the need for all individu-
als to participate as equals. 116 Critical theorists differ from civic
republicans, however, in that they consider deliberative politics to extend
beyond the formally-organized political system to the public sphere of civil
society.117 Indeed, Habermasian critical scholars propose a "two-track"
version of deliberative politics that accords a prominent role to informally
organized associations of civil society. Because the key role of civil society
is to identify and interpret social problems and bring them to the fore-
front, "a good part of the normative expectations connected with delibera-
tive politics" falls onto civil society associations.118 In fact, Habermas
emphasizes that the task of shaping public opinion must not be left to the
political system.119
Nevertheless, much like civic republicans, critical scholars recognize
that civil society associations can be "anarchic" and self-interested. 120
Hence, to Habermas, political decision making falls to the state and the
established party system, which "filter" reasons for preferring one norma-
tive interpretation over another through institutionalized deliberation
processes (such as parliamentary deliberation). Deliberative politics thus
depends on "the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with
informally developed public opinions."1 21
Because Habermasian critical theory ties the flourishing of civil soci-
ety to a liberal rights framework, 122 Third World scholars have criticized it
as excluding those Third World voices that do not fit neatly within such a
framework, thus omitting a wide swath of actors (for example, Islamic or
Native American social movements) from critical deliberation about the
116. See Habermas, supra note 103, at 27.
117. Kenneth Baynes, A Critical Theory Perspective on Civil Society and the State, in
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 5, at 123, 128 (discussing Habermas' theories
of civil society and emphasizing that public associations of civil society have the unique abil-
ity to "interpret[] social needs and problems, and shap[e] public opinion in response to
them"); see also HABERMAS, supra note 113, at 275 ("A deliberative practice of self-legisla-
tion can develop only in the interplay between, on the one hand, the parliamentary will-
formation institutionalized in legal procedures and programmed to reach decisions and, on
the other, political opinion-formation along informal channels of political communication.").
118. HABERMAs, supra note 113, at 358.
119. Id. ,
120. See id. at 307-08 ("On account of its anarchic structure, the general public sphere
is, on the one hand, more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally
distributed social power, structural violence, and systematically distorted communication
than are the institutionalized public spheres of parliamentary bodies.").
121. Id. at 298.
122. Id. at 366-67, 371 ("[A] robust civil society can develop only in the context of a
liberal political culture . . . it can blossom only in an already rationalized lifeworld.").
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common good.123 Third World scholars have also criticized this emphasis
on a liberal rights framework as privileging established NGOs by requiring
that advocacy groups acquire legal identity-and consequently legal rec-
ognition as legitimate nonstate actors by the state-before they can be
considered part of civil society.124 This conflation significantly narrows the
type of associations that are allowed to participate in international law-
making and implementation.
Feminist, Third World, and minority scholars have also criticized the
Habermasian ideal of the public sphere as leading to the de facto exclusion
of marginal or minority views. In Habermasian critical theory, the ideal
version of the public sphere imagines a single realm where individuals
from all walks of life put aside their differences in status to deliberate as
equals on issues of general interest.125 Scholars such as Nancy Fraser, Iris
Marion Young, and Jane Mansbridge have pointed out, however, that so-
cial inequalities continue to distort deliberation, even when all participants
are formally equal.126 Power and economic inequalities reproduce them-
selves in deliberative interactions irrespective of the formal equality of all
participants.127 This is because inequalities informally affect deliberation
so that those privileged economic or social groups tend to dominate the
discussion, which is often conducted using language and terms with which
dominant groups are more comfortable, and which often focuses on topics
of greater interest to those dominant groups.128
Feminist and Third World critical approaches to civil society seek to
"render visible the ways in which societal inequality infects formally inclu-
sive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within
them."129 The next Section explores these approaches.
3. Inward-Outward Theories: Feminist, Minority,
and Third World Critical Theories
Like Habermasian critical scholars, feminist, Third World, and minor-
ity critical theorists emphasize the importance of deliberation in the public
sphere for democratic government. In particular, they agree with the
Habermasian and civic republican criticism of interest-based politics (as
123. See, e.g., BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOw 259-61
(2003).
124. Id. at 261.
125. Cf Fraser, supra note 32, at 62 (criticizing the Habermasian assumption that "a
single, comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics").
126. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 32, at 62; Jane Mansbridge, Democracy, Deliberation,
and the Experience of Women, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS 122, 123 (Bernard Murchland ed., 1991); Iris Marion Young, Communication and
the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 120, 122-23 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); see infra Part
I.E.3.
127. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 32, at 63-64.
128. Id. at 64.
129. Id. at 65.
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exemplified by market liberal theories), which conceive of democratic de-
cisions as compromises among self-interested actors.130 They also endorse
the tripartite model of civil society that distinguishes civil society from
both the state and the economy for the reasons described above: namely,
that the tripartite model makes clear that the ability of civil society to act
as a watchdog and critic depends upon its independence from both state
coercion and market imperatives. 131
These theorists, however, have three major points of disagreement
with Habermasian critical theory: (1) the ideal of a single public sphere,
(2) the prioritization of legally constituted and formally recognized organi-
zations, and (3) the focus on debates about the common good. First, femi-
nist, minority, and Third World theorists criticize the Habermasian ideal of
a single public sphere where all participants bracket their inequalities and
debate as if equals relying only on reasoned arguments.132 To these theo-
rists, this required bracketing of differences is neither practically achieva-
ble, nor normatively desirable. It is not practically achievable because
"informal impediments to participatory parity . . . can persist even after
everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate."13 3 Minority
groups may have internalized barriers to participation-for example, a di-
minished sense of one's right to speak, to interrupt, or to assert one's opin-
ion.134 Additionally, these groups may lack the necessary training to
express their points of view through the speech style that is most valued in
arenas of public debate, that is, through formal and general arguments,
rather than through personal narratives; and through assertive and con-
frontational statements rather than tentative or conciliatory ones.135
130. See, e.g., Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996) (summarizing the contributions of feminist critical theorists Jane Mansfield, Seyla
Benhabib, Iris Marion Young, Amy Gutman, and Chantal Mouffe, as "defending a version of
'deliberative democracy' [espoused by Habermas] as providing the most adequate conceptual
and institutional model for theorizing the democratic experience of complex societies");
Mansbridge, supra note 126, at 122-23.
131. See Fraser, supra note 32, at 57.
132. See, e.g., Young, supra note 126, at 123 ("Despite the claim of deliberative forms of
orderly meetings to express pure universal reason, the norms of deliberation are culturally
specific and often operate as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some
people."); Iris Marion Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Femi-
nist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE 57, 59 (Seyla
Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987) ("Habermas remains too committed to the ideals of
impartiality and universality.").
133. Fraser, supra note 32, at 63.
134. Young, supra note 126, at 124 (noting that "[in many formal situations the better-
educated white middle-class people . . . often act as though they have a right to speak and
that their words carry authority, whereas those of other groups often feel intimidated by the
argument requirements and the formality and rules of parliamentary procedures, so they do
not speak, or speak only a way [sic] that those in charge find 'disruptive."').
135. Feminist scholars such as Nancy Fraser, Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge
remark that the deliberative style predominant in public spheres tends to view deliberation as
a contest. Deliberation-as-contest privileges assertive and confrontational styles, which are
often male-centric, over exploratory or conciliatory ones, which are often female-centric. See,
e.g., Young, supra note 126, at 122-24.
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Bracketing participants' differences is not normatively desirable: it can
mask subtle forms of domination of minority groups by majority elites by
treating as neutral a type of deliberative style that is, in fact, culturally
contingent.136 Feminist and minority scholars emphasize the historical
domination of public spaces of deliberation by white, upper-middle class
men. This domination, they argue, has given rise to a type of rhetorical
style that privileges dispassionate over passionate speech, that views delib-
eration as competition rather than collaboration, and that presents these
forms of speaking as the application of "pure universal reason."137 A key
insight of these theorists is that the norms of deliberation of a single delib-
erative public sphere are likely to reflect the cultural preferences of domi-
nant groups and thus can "operate as forms of power that silence or
devalue the speech of [minorities]."1 38
Rather than espouse Habermas' ideal single public sphere, feminist,
minority, and Third World theorists conceive of civil society as constituted
by multiple publics. These multiple publics are thought to enhance, rather
than diminish, the democratic potential of civil society. To Habermas, the
emergence of multiple arenas of debate is a sign of fragmentation, which
he postulates undermines deliberative democracy.139 In contrast, feminist
critical theories tend to view the coexistence of multiple publics as a re-
source that ultimately enhances deliberation in the broader public
sphere.140 Multiple publics enhance deliberation by allowing for the devel-
opment of perspectives irreducible to the common good, which can ulti-
mately transform the opinions of the dominant public.141 Because a single
public sphere is likely to drown minority critiques, smaller arenas of delib-
eration where minority groups can come together can help these groups
"find the right voice or words to express their thoughts" and "articulate
and defend their interests in the comprehensive public sphere."1 42 Femi-
nist critical scholar Nancy Fraser has termed these smaller arenas of delib-
eration "subaltern counterpublics" to capture their dual function as both
inward-looking spaces where subordinated social groups develop their
"identities, interests, and needs" and outward-looking arenas where mi-
norities deliberate about and develop alternative and often contestatory
interpretations of accepted norms.143
136. See, e.g., Mansbridge, supra note 126, at 130-31, 134.
137. Young, supra note 126, at 123.
138. Id.
139. HABERMAS, supra note 104, at 307-08.
140. See Fraser, supra note 32, at 62.
141. Young, supra note 126, at 127.
142. Fraser, supra note 32, at 64, 66.
143. Id. at 67-68 ("[Slubaltern counterpublics have a dual character. On the one hand,
they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function
as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics."). For
example, Fraser credits feminist subaltern counterpublics with developing new language to
re-conceptualize social practices that were either previously accepted by society at large, or
that remained a hidden social problem. Id. at 68. Thus, terms such as "marital rape" ques-
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Because they recognize that dominant rhetorical styles are historically
and culturally-contingent, feminist, minority, and Third World critical the-
ories stress the importance of integrating different modes of communica-
tion into public deliberation. These theories emphasize, first, that some
minority groups may be unable to express their points of view through
formal and general arguments.'" Second, they highlight the importance of
different forms of communication, in particular informal, first person nar-
rative styles, to "supplement argument by providing ways of speaking
across difference in the absence of significant shared understandings."1 4 5
A second critique of Habermasian critical theory focuses on how an
understanding of civil society that privileges formally recognized and for-
mally constituted NGOs (a process often called "NGOization") under-
mines Third World social movements and de-politicizes civil society.146
For example, scholarship on law and development has criticized the
"NGOization of civil society [as] severely limit[ing] its radical democratic
potential" by excluding social movements that do not have a recognized
legal identity.147 But it is precisely these social movements-and not
NGOs constituted by Anglophone cosmopolitan actors-that command
grassroot support in developing states and are thus seen as legitimate rep-
resentatives of their interests.148 These scholars have also condemned in-
ternational development institutions for viewing NGOs merely as
providers of efficient technical solutions to development problems. To
these critics, such an instrumental view of NGOs "largely ignores, down-
tioned the state's reluctance to interfere. Id. at 67. The term "double shift" emphasized soci-
ety's unspoken expectations that women who hold full-time jobs take care of the majority of
household duties. Id.
144. See, e.g., Young, supra note 126, at 124 (arguing that norms of deliberation that
privilege formal and general speech "must be learned," because they are "culturally specific"
and often a "sign of social privilege").
145. Id. at 129, 131; accord Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2411, 2413, 2439 (1989) (emphasizing the key role of
narrative-or counterstories-in challenging dominant mindsets, those "bundle[s] of presup-
positions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal
and political discourse takes place").
146. Sonia E. Alvarez, Beyond NGO-ization, Reflections from Latin America, 52 DEV.
175, 176 (2009) (defining "NGOization" as "national and global neo-liberalism's active pro-
motion and official sanctioning of particular organizational forms and practices among femi-
nist organizations and other sectors of civil society"). In particular, Alvarez criticizes the
promotion and endorsement by national states, Intergovernmental Organizations and Inter-
national Financial Institutions of "more rhetorically restrained, politically collaborative and
technically proficient feminist practices." Id.
147. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 123, at 261; accord Alvarez, supra note 146, at 175. For
example, the U.N. Economic and Social Counsel (ECOSOC) requires applicants for consult-
ative status with the U.N. to "provide a copy of the registration paper or, if your country does
not require registration, please provide other proof of existence." Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, NGO Branch, How to Apply for Consultative Status, UNITED NATIONS,
http://csonet.org/?menu=83 (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
148. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 123, at 261-62.
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plays, or attempts to coopt the political role of NGOs."149 According to
this thinking, the proper role of civil society (and of NGOs) is to criticize
the development project as it is currently imagined by international orga-
nizations, thus creating "alternative development discourses and
practices."150
Finally, feminist, minority, and Third World critical scholars also criti-
cize the requirement that all participants deliberate about the common
good. Feminist scholars point out that what precisely constitutes the "com-
mon good" is debatable. The indefiniteness and malleability of the concept
has the potential to privilege the perspectives of dominant groups and thus
be oppressive to minorities.151 Rather than focus on defining the common
good, or finding areas of agreement, the key functions of deliberation
should be to expose participants to multiple perspectives, often not reduci-
ble to a single common good. This exposure helps participants expand
their points of view: by illuminating the partiality of each participant's van-
tage point while simultaneously exposing all involved to multiple perspec-
tives, participants "can come to understand something about the ways
proposals and claims affect others differently situated."1 52 Furthermore,
deliberation can aid participants to pinpoint precisely where their differ-
ences lie, for example by forcing the articulation of unspoken
assumptions.' 53
The emphasis on multiple, smaller publics, however, runs the risk of
creating isolated enclaves. In other words, unless sufficient emphasis is
placed on the mechanisms whereby the contestatory ideas developed in
these smaller publics can impact wider publics, and unless wider publics
are receptive to these ideas, fostering minority spaces may result in either
isolation or tokenism.154 Additionally, there is in principle no guarantee
that the contestatory ideas developed in these smaller publics will be de-
mocracy-enhancing. In fact, these smaller publics could be deeply illiberal
groups, or develop into radical groups that seek to destabilize or foreclose,
149. William F. Fisher, Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices, 26
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 439, 445-46 (1997).
150. Id. at 443. Third World critical scholars have endorsed Fraser's re-conceptualiza-
tion of the public sphere as both accommodating social movements and recognizing their
contestatory function. For example, Balakrishnan Rajagopal emphasizes that Nancy Fraser's
notion of subaltern counterpublics, "which stresses the need to recognize a plurality of civil
societies that may exist in these counterpublics, is much more capable of representing the
actually existing practices of social movements." RAJAGOPAL, supra note 123, at 262.
151. Fraser, supra note 32, at 72; Young, supra note 126, at 126.
152. Young, supra note 126, at 128.
153. In particular, allowing deliberation to take into account claims of self- or group-
interest may help minority groups "find ways to discover that the prevailing sense of 'we'
does not adequately include them." Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democracy, AM. PROS-
PEcr, Spring 1990, at 126, 131.
154. For example, dominant groups may "pretend" to listen to minority concerns, and
provide token concessions to minority demands, while not allowing minority views to have a
substantial impact on policy outcomes.
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rather than enrich, the conversation in wider publics.155 Two mechanisms
may mitigate this isolation: first, these smaller publics have a dual orienta-
tion, one of which is outward-looking; that is, they seek to interact with the
wider public. Second, in multicultural societies, overlapping group mem-
berships are likely to at least partially counter isolation by diffusing ideas
among overlapping publics.156
4. Boundary-Crossing Theories: New Governance,
State-Society Synergy Theories
All theories explored in the preceding sections view civil society as a
separate sphere, independent from the state. In fact, most democratic po-
litical theories of civil society consider that a sharp separation between the
state and civil society is necessary for the latter to maintain its indepen-
dence and thus its ability to represent a legitimate check on state power.' 57
Nevertheless, a diverse group of scholars increasingly pays attention to
mechanisms of coordination between civil society and the state that accord
civil society a more direct role in policy formation.158 I focus here on these
initiatives, as well as on recent proposals by both legal and political science
scholars that tend to blur the boundaries between civil society and the
state.
155. While acknowledging their potential for engendering illiberal tendencies, some
feminist scholars have emphasized that illiberal groups may, paradoxically, serve to contain
these tendencies. For example, Nancy Rosenblum argues that a function of associational life
may be as much to contain vice as to promote civic virtue. ROSENBLUM, supra note 67, at 349-
51. This is because some associations which foster such un-civic values as snobbery and sepa-
ratism may provide "safety valves" that contain these illiberal tendencies. Id. at 349. These
outlets can provide psychological benefits to members and contribute to the maintenance of
the social order by instilling individuals with a measure of self-respect, by providing them
with the opportunity "not only to belong but also to exclude others, [with] some place where
their contributions are affirmed and where the likelihood of failure is reduced." Id.
156. The idea that overlapping memberships can moderate extreme views and thus pre-
serve democratic stability has a long history in pluralist theories of democracy. See SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLrIsCS 88-89 (1960) (arguing that
"chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a
number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations").
157. See generally Post & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 90.
158. See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 397 (proposing a set of institutional reforms
that accord "secondary groups an extensive and explicitly public role"); Fraser, supra note 32,
at 76 (arguing for a "conception [of civil society] that can permit us to envision a greater role
for (at least some) public spheres than mere autonomous opinion formation removed from
authoritative decision-making"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a
Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 310-11 (2004) (arguing for a new horizon-
tal conception of self-government "resting on the empirical fact of mushrooming private gov-
ernance regimes in which individuals, groups, and corporate entities in domestic and
transnational society generate the rules, norms, and principles they are prepared to live by");
Lucio Baccaro, Civil Society Meets the State: A Model of Associational Democracy 1 (Int'l
Inst. for Labour Studies, Discussion Paper Series No. 138, 2002) (proposing a new model of
associational democracy in which "state and civil society organizations are both part of a
single new regulatory framework that transforms both").
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Rather than dealing with a discrete theory of civil society, this final
Section combines three approaches that advocate a more direct role for
civil society associations in lawmaking and implementation in collabora-
tion with the state: some critical theory approaches, new governance the-
ory, and state-society synergy theory. I briefly analyze each below.
Some critical scholars emphasize the need to move beyond the state-
civil society dichotomy and allow civil society associations to participate in
the political process as decision and policy makers.159 For example, Joshua
Cohen and Joel Rogers propose a more direct and formal governance role
for groups in areas where the objects of regulation are either too dis-
persed, too numerous, or too mutable for the government to set compli-
ance standards and monitor performance.160 This effort to incorporate
civil society into decision-making processes traditionally reserved to par-
liamentary bodies mirrors "new governance" initiatives that seek to pro-
mote experimentation at multiple levels of government, and to foster
deliberation and participation in government by recognizing a key role for
civil society actors as policy makers.161 Blurring the boundaries between
state, market, and civil society, new governance scholars argue, fosters co-
operation, experimentalism, and innovation. 162 New governance scholars
believe that allowing civil society (and also the market) to participate in
lawmaking and implementation imbues all sectors of society with a prob-
lem-solving spirit whereby common problems can be tackled creatively.163
159. Nancy Fraser criticizes the Habermasian conception of civil society for promoting
a sharp separation between associational civil society, whose deliberation results only in opi-
nionformation (which she terms "weak publics"), and parliamentary bodies, whose delibera-
tion encompasses binding decisionmaking (which she terms "strong publics"). Fraser, supra
note 32, at 75. Fraser argues that some particular contexts may call for the direct participation
of civil society in lawmaking. Id. Fraser does not, however, specify which types of situation
may call for this direct participation. Id. Cohen and Rogers provide a more detailed elabora-
tion of particular contexts that call for a more direct role for civil society in policymaking.
Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 447-454.
160. Cohen and Rogers emphasize three key attributes of civil society organizations
that allow them to positively contribute to democratic governance in these areas: their ability
to provide on-the-ground information to policy-makers; their potential to equalize represen-
tation of dispersed interests by pooling them, thus making representation more fine-grained;
and their ability to act as innovative problem solvers. Cohen & Rogers, supra note 35, at 424-
26. These attributes may be particularly important when policymaking and implementation
requires coordination among various actors, or when it requires that policies be tailored to
specific local conditions.
161. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Govern-
ance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MiNN. L. REV. 342, 442 (2004) ("[Tlhe obsessive
maintenance of traditional boundaries-including those of public and private, profit and non-
profit, formal and informal, theory and practice, secular and religious, left and right-is no
longer a major concern with the shift to the Renew Deal [that is the New Governance] para-
digm."); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 549 (2000) (arguing for the "reorient[ation] of administrative law toward facilitating the
effectiveness of public/private regulatory regimes and away from the traditional project of
constraining agency discretion").
162. See Lobel, supra note 161, at 375-376.
163. See id. at 442.
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Importantly, in this framework, the role of the government shifts from reg-
ulator and controller to facilitator in the shared problem-solving enter-
prise.TM Finally, state-civil society synergy theorists point to empirical
research that provides additional reasons for fostering "ties that connect
citizens and public officials across the public-private divide." 165 Social sci-
ence field work has found that when state officials are embedded in the
communities in which they work, they create synergies that lead to the
more efficient implementation of state policies. "State-society synergy" re-
quires both complementary efforts by state and civil society, that is, efforts
that rely on a more traditional division of labor between the two realms,
and embeddedness, that is, the development of ties that cross the public-
private divide.166
A direct policy-making and implementation role for civil society orga-
nizations, however, may perpetuate existing social inequalities by allowing
groups that already possess a large amount of political power to direct
decision making and implementation to their own benefit (and likely to
the detriment of society at large). This concern is exacerbated in situations
where groups with unequal power and clashing priorities compete to influ-
ence regulation in areas with scarce resources. 167 Thus, any regime that
seeks to institutionalize a role for civil society in policy making should
include mechanisms to safeguard representativeness and to foster a collab-
orative environment among participating stakeholders. These mechanisms
can include rotation schedules for civil society organizations, so that single
groups do not dominate the discussion, and multiple perspectives can con-
tribute to the debate without sacrificing efficiency. Additionally, as men-
tioned above, for those civil society theorists (such as feminist, Third
World, and minority scholars) who prize civil society's ability to develop
alternative and often transgressive critiques of the state, a direct role of
164. Id. at 348, 377 (identifying the following features as key elements of a new govern-
ance regime: "increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity
and competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility
and non-coerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among pro-
liferated norm-generating entities.").
165. See Peter Evans, State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Develop-
ment, in GOVERNMENT ACTION, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT: REVIEWING THE Evi-
DENCE ON SYNERGY 178, 180 (Peter Evans ed., 1996).
166. Id. at 179-80. Relying on experimental data from different instances of state-civil
society collaborations, Evans identifies two key features of successful synergy: complemen-
tarity and embeddedness. Complementarity requires that the state ensure rule-governed en-
vironments that enable diverse civil society organizations to flourish. Embeddedness
facilitates implementation by creating dense networks of ties that bind local state and civil
society actors. Id.; see also Danielle M. Varda, A Network Perspective on State-Society Syn-
ergy to Increase Community-Level Social Capital, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q.
896, 896 (2011) (arguing that synergistic interactions between the state and civil society in-
crease the levels of bridging social capital, thus improving implementation outcomes).
167. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 161, at 458 (recognizing that new governance ap-
proaches may produce "a vicious cycle under certain circumstances-tilting more and more
entitlements in favor of those already in power").
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civil society in policy making and implementation risks the moderation of
critique and the further NGOization of civil society.168
This Part developed a framework that allows for a more fine-grained
analysis of the diverse purposes and functions that can be performed by
different civil society associations. I argued that the purposes and func-
tions of civil society organizations range from inward to outward-looking.
I then posited that five theoretical approaches to civil society map onto
this framework and justify emphasizing particular purposes and functions
of civil society while minimizing others. This theoretical framework is de-
picted below in Figure 2:
Civil Society State




Character formation Trust Wh
Identity formation Reciprocity Watchdog
Self-respect Citizenship Critic
Self-sufficiency




Feminist/Third World/ Critical/New Gov./
Minority Synergy
FIGURE 2
Although not all of the functions of civil society depicted in Figures 1
and 2 are mutually exclusive, and it is certainly possible for a single civil
society organization to seek to achieve both inward-looking and outward-
looking goals, there are often trade-offs. For example, groups that seek to
focus on the personal discovery and growth of their members may have to
put aside discussions about shared values and the common good.169 Con-
versely, groups organized for efficient political representation may fail to
serve as sources of individual identity.170 More importantly for the pur-
168. See supra Part I.E.3.
169. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 67, at 37.
170. Id. (noting that while organized political interest groups may "serve the classic
function of political representation," they "may fail to serve as important reference points for
the moral dispositions of members or to foster deep commitment to democratic values or to
the political community as a whole").
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pose of this work, international organizations seeking civil society partici-
pation should recognize the variety of functions performed by different
kinds of civil society organizations, and the normative theories that ex-
plain and justify a focus on certain attributes at the expense of others. As I
began to explore in this Part, understanding civil society through the lens
of each of the five families of theories described above (which in turn em-
phasize particular functions of civil society) has consequences for the de-
sign of international institutions. In Part II, I apply the theoretical
framework developed in this Part to a concrete example, the UNAIDS
monitoring process to the HIV/AIDS Declaration of Commitment, to
work out in more detail how choosing one theoretical interpretation over
another will lead to different institutional designs.
II. APPLYING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE HIV/AIDS
DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT AND UNAIDS
MONITORING PROCESS
This Part provides a brief overview of the global efforts to address the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, with an emphasis on the HIV/AIDS Declaration of
Commitment and the UNAIDS monitoring process. It then gives exam-
ples of how UNAIDS initiatives to increase civil society engagement pro-
vide inconsistent definitions of civil society that reveal the absence of an
analytical framework to guide policy prescriptions. Finally, it demonstrates
the importance of developing such a framework by analyzing how the the-
oretical framework described in Part I would counsel different institu-
tional designs for civil society participation.
A. History and Content of UNGASS Commitments
In the year 2000, the Security Council, for the first time in its history,
debated a global health issue. 171 The Council considered that the acceler-
ating spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic "may pose a risk to stability and
security," and urged states to redouble their efforts to mount a coordi-
nated campaign against the epidemic.172 The Security Council also en-
couraged "additional discussion among relevant United Nation bodies,
Member States, industry and other relevant organizations to make pro-
gress, inter alia, on the question of access to treatment and care, and on
prevention."1 73 In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly convened a Special
Session (UNGASS) dedicated to HIV/AIDS.174 At the close of the meet-
ing, representatives of 189 nations unanimously adopted the Declaration
171. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of
AIDS on Peace and Security in Africa, U.N. Press Release SC/6781 (Jan. 10, 2000); Rx for
Survival; Politics and Global Health, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/rxforsurvival/series/politics/who.united.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) ("In 2000 ...
health moved for the first time onto the agenda of the UN Security Council. . . ."); S.C. Res.
1308, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000).
172. S.C. Res. 1308, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000).
173. Id. 6.
174. See G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc AIRES/S-26/2 (Aug. 2, 2001).
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of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: "Global Crisis-Global Action"
(Declaration)."'
The Declaration calls for the development of national strategies that
involve "civil society and . . . business" as one of the pillars of a national
response.176 It also commits states to submit country progress reports to
UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, once every
two years.177 Currently, in a single monitoring process, UNAIDS report-
ing guidelines combine UNGASS targets with commitments set forth in
three other U.N. Resolutions on HIV/AIDS: the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals' 78 and two Political Declarations of Commitment. 79 These
three resolutions along with the Declaration represent the core interna-
tional commitments in the global fight against AIDS.
UNAIDS has designed a series of core indicators to monitor coun-
tries' progress.180 Indicators include epidemiological data related to the
spread of the disease and population behavioral patterns, as well as data
that reflect the countries' HIV/AIDS policy environment. The latter data
is used to derive the National Composite Policy Index (NCPI), designed to
''assess progress in the development and implementation of national level
175. Id.; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], Monitoring the
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, Guidelines on Construction of Core Indicators,
UNAIDS/07.12E /JC1318E, 9 (April 2007) [hereinafter UNAIDS, 2007 Core Indicator
Guidelines] ("At the close of the groundbreaking UNGASS on HIV/AIDS in June 2001, 189
Member States adopted the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.").
176. G.A. Res. S-26/2, supra note 174 37.
177. UNAIDS, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) are the key players in the international re-
sponse to HIV/AIDS.
178. "To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the
scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity" and "[t]o provide special
assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS" are two of the eight Millennium Develop-
ment Goals adopted by the General Assembly in the year 2000. G.A. Res. 55/2, 1 19, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
179. See generally G.A. Res. 65/277, 15 50, 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/277 (July 8, 2011)
(reaffirming the 2006 Declaration of Commitment and setting new targets, which include, by
2015, to reduce sexual transmission of HIV and HIV infection among people who inject
drugs by half, to increase the number of people on treatment to 15 million, to halve TB-
related deaths in people living with HIV, and to eliminate new HIV infections among chil-
dren); G.A. Res. 60/262, 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006).
180. UNAIDS, Global AIDS Response Progress Reporting 2012: Guidelines, at 8,
UNAIDS/JC2215E (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter UNAIDS, 2011 Core Indicator Guidelines];
UNAIDS, Monitoring the Declaration of Commitment on HIVIAIDS: Guidelines on Con-
struction of Core Indicators, at 9, UNAIDS/09.10E/JC1676E (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter
UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines]; see also UNAIDS, SCALING UP ACCESS To HIV
PREVENTION, TREATMENT, CARE AND SUPPORT: THE NEXT STEPs (2006) available at http://
data.unaids.org/fPublications/IRC-pub07/jcl267-univaccess-thenextsteps-en.pdf; UNAIDS,
Setting Targets for Moving Towards Universal Access (UNAIDS Working Doc., Oct. 2006),
available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/guidelines/2006/20061006-report-universal access-tar
gets-guidelines.en.pdf.
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HIV and AIDS policies, strategies and laws." 181 The NCPI is based on
interviews with two groups: (1) government officials, and (2) bilateral
agencies, U.N. organizations, and civil society organizations.
The NCPI queries whether countries have "ensured the full involve-
ment and participation of civil society in the development of a mul-
tisectoral strategy." 182 In addition, UNAIDS encourages governments to
involve civil society in the monitoring and evaluation process itself, by
convening workshops before the drafting of the report and by reviewing
progress reports. Reporting guidelines emphasize that the preparation of
national reports should include input from civil society as "partners" that
can "provide quantitative and qualitative information to augment the data
collected by governments[,] . . . provide a valuable perspective on the is-
sues included in the National Composite Policy Index, and .. . participate
in the review and vetting process for progress reports."183 UNAIDS em-
phasizes the importance of process in the elaboration of the UNGASS re-
ports as an opportunity to develop civil society/government partnerships,
noting that "the importance of the Index lies in the process of data collec-
tion and data reconciliation between different stakeholders, detailed anal-
ysis of the responses, and its use in strengthening the national HIV
response." 184 UNAIDS discourages, however, the preparation of indepen-
dent shadow reports-limiting them to cases in which civil society strongly
feels it was not adequately included in the national reporting process or
the state is unable to provide an official report.185
Once every two years, UNAIDS compiles country progress reports,
which are reviewed at a special UN General Assembly meeting ("High
181. UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 27; see also UNAIDS,
2011 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 139-42 (NCPI questionnaire for civil soci-
ety organizations and others).
182. UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 27, 94 (footnote and
internal quotation marks omitted). The 2011 Guidelines similarly ask whether the govern-
ment has included civil society in planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation of the na-
tional response to HIV. UNAIDS, 2011 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 139-40.
183. UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 16. The 2011 Guide-
lines characterize civil society's contribution to the national response in similar terms, em-
phasizing that "civil society organizations are well positioned to provide quantitative and
qualitative information to augment the data collected by governments." UNAIDS, 2011 Core
Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 15.
184. UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 28.
185. UNAIDS, 2011 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 15 ("Shadow reports
by civil society will be accepted . . . [but] are not intended as a parallel reporting process for
civil society. Wherever possible UNAIDS encourages civil society integration into national
reporting processes. . . . Shadow reports are intended to provide an alternative perspective
where it is strongly felt that civil society was not adequately included in the national report-
ing process, where governments do not submit a Country Progress Report, or where data
provided by government differs considerably from data collected by civil society monitoring
government progress in service delivery."); UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra
note 180, at 16.
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Level Meeting").186 Civil society can participate in the review process by
attending civil society hearings and round-tables. 187 Civil society participa-
tion at the international level is channeled through a "Civil Society Task
Force," which aims to coordinate communication among civil society par-
ticipants, provide input on the themes for the round tables, and advise on
civil society accreditation to attend.' 88
B. Inconsistent Definitions of Civil Society:
Lack of an Analytical Framework
Despite numerous references to civil society involvement, UNGASS
documents do not provide a clear definition of what groups constitute civil
society. Neither do they undertake an analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses that different civil society constituents may bring to the response
nor an assessment of whether the inclusion of certain types of groups
should be favored. In short, the UNGASS process lacks an analytical
framework that addresses why civil society should be involved in the re-
sponse, which kinds of associations should participate, what kind of rela-
tionship the state should have with civil society, and how the international
community should interact with both civil society and individual states.
For example, some passages in UNGASS preparatory documents in-
clude the business sector in its definition of civil society.189 In contrast,
186. UNAIDS, Know Your Response, http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/
knowyourresponse/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (listing available country progress reports);
UNAIDS, 2007 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 175, at 7 ("Reports received by
UNAIDS, on behalf of the Secretary-General, are used to prepare the Report on the Global
AIDS Epidemic"); G.A. Res. S-26/2, supra note 174, 1 100 (calling on the General Assembly
to "[d]evote sufficient time and at least one full day of the annual session of the General
Assembly to review and debate a report of the Secretary-General on progress achieved in
realizing the commitments set out in the present Declaration"); G.A. Res. 65/180, 1, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/65/180 (Dec. 20, 2010) (calling for a High Level Meeting to "undertake a com-
prehensive review of the progress achieved in realizing the [2001] Declaration of Commit-
ment on HIV/AIDS and the [2006] Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS").
187. See, e.g., Informal Interactive Hearing with Civil Society for the High Level Meeting
on AIDS, UNAIDS. Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids/unitednation-
sdeclarationsandgoals/2011highlevelmeetingonaids/csh/ (describing the informal civil society
hearing at the 2011 High Level Meeting on AIDS); U.N. President of the Gen. Assembly,
Letter dated Mar. 4, 2011, from the President of the 65th Session of the General Assembly to
the Member States (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/medialunaids/con-
tentassets/documents/document/2011/20110304_HLMPGAs letter.pdf (announcing the es-
tablishment of a civil society task force to assist in "organising the civil society hearing and
with maximising civil society input at the [High Level Meeting]").
188. See Civil Society Application Process to Participate in the 2011 United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly High Level Meeting on AIDS and Civil Society Hearing, UNAIDS, http://
www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids/unitednationsdeclarationsandgoals/2011highlevelmeetingon
aids/civilsocietyand20llhighlevelmeetingonaids/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
189. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/13, 14, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/13 (Nov. 16, 2000) ("[The
General Assembly] [i]nvites, in this context, the President of the General Assembly to make
recommendations, for consideration by Member States during the preparatory process ... as
to the form of the involvement of such civil society actors, in particular associations of people
living with HIV/AIDS, non-governmental organizations and the business sector, including
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some passages of the Declaration differentiate civil society from both the
business and the "private" sectors,190 while other passages draw a distinc-
tion only between civil society and the "private sector," 191 or between civil
society and business.192 Again, other segments of the Declaration appear
to distinguish civil society from local communities, people living with HIVI
AIDS and vulnerable groups, suggesting that the term civil society is per-
haps meant to encompass NGOs with a developed advocacy agenda.193
Yet, other passages indicate civil society includes people living with HIV/
AIDS, vulnerable groups, and caregivers.194
The Civil Society Task Force described above includes representatives
from the business sector,195 once again suggesting a broad view of civil
society. The list of civil society organizations approved for participation in
the high-level meeting includes several large pharmaceutical companies
such as Merck, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, as
well as other international corporations such as Exxon Mobil.196 Impor-
tantly, neither UNGASS preparatory documents nor the Declaration ad-
dress whether nonprofit organizations that represent private, for-profit
interests (such as business associations or lobbying groups) should be con-
pharmaceutical companies, in the special session and, to the extent possible, in the prepara-
tory process.") (emphasis added).
190. G.A. Res. S-26/2, supra note 174, 103 ("We look forward to strong leadership by
Governments and concerted efforts with the full and active participation of the United Na-
tions, the entire multilateral system, civil society, the business community and private sec-
tor . . . .") (removed emphasis).
191. Id. 46 (stating that one action must be to "establish and strengthen mechanisms
that involve the private sector and civil society partners and people living with HIV/AIDS and
vulnerable groups in the fight against HIV/AIDS") (emphasis added).
192. Id. 55 ("By 2003, ensure that national strategies, supported by regional and inter-
national strategies, are developed in close collaboration with the international community,
including Governments and relevant intergovernmental organizations as well as with civil
society and the business sector . . . .") (emphasis added).
193. Id. 27 ("Welcoming the progress made in some countries to contain the epi-
demic, particularly through . . . working in partnership with communities, civil society, people
living with HIV/AIDS and vulnerable groups ......") (emphasis added).
194. Id. 1 94 ("Conduct national periodic reviews with the participation of civil society,
particularly people living with HIV/AIDS, vulnerable groups and caregivers, of progress
achieved in realizing these commitments . . . .").
195. Amy Coulterman, Civil Society Task Force Chosen for the Comprehensive AIDS
Review, NGO DELEGATION TO THE UNAIDS PROGRAMME COORDINATING BOARD (Feb. 4,
2011), http://unaidspcbngo.org/?p=10780.
196. The full list of international companies approved to participate as civil society in
the 2008 High Level meetings is: Becton Dickinson & Co., Bristol-Myers Squibb, Exxon
Mobile, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Mylan and Pfizer. President of the General Assembly, List
of Civil Society Representatives to be Invited to Participate in the High-Level Meeting on a
Comprehensive Review of the Progress Achieved in Realizing the Declaration Commitment on
HIVIAIDS and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/62/CRP.1, (Apr.
23, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 List of Civil Society Representatives]. The full list for 2011 is
available at http://unaidspcbngo.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Organizations-for-HLM
.pdf.
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sidered part of civil society and, if so, how they should participate in the
response.
In addition, several HIV/AIDS documents contain a long list of attrib-
utes of civil society but do not engage in an analysis of the relative impor-
tance of these attributes for a coordinated response, or study the extent to
which the UNGASS process should seek to enhance certain capacities of
civil society (and if so, how).197 The Guidelines and other UNGASS docu-
ments leave unexamined whether the state or the international community
should delegate monitoring and implementation to a market-ordered civil
society while providing minimal oversight (for example, as advocated by
market liberals); act as a coordinator of the national response by fostering
local experimentation by civil society while facilitating the scaling up of
successful initiatives and preventing duplicative efforts (for example, as
advocated by new governance scholars); or engage civil society only indi-
rectly by considering its opinions but delegating ultimate responsibility for
drafting a monitoring and implementation plan to the legislature or other
governmental body (for example, as advocated by civic republicans).
Analyzing the consequences of tight state control versus loose organi-
zational oversight would bring to light the consequences of two modes of
operation that may already be functioning in an ad hoc fashion in different
countries. Although the more outward-looking partnership and policy
making and the more inward-looking "individual empowerment" roles of
civil society could coexist, particular institutional designs and modes of
participation may require trade-offs. For example, a monitoring system
like the one currently in place for UNGASS that discourages the prepara-
tion of shadow reports and that requires a relatively high level of technical
sophistication may discourage local national constituencies from engaging
directly with the reporting process and from bringing their concerns to the
attention of the international community, thus indirectly disempowering
more local and less organized civil society organizations. A discussion
about the proper role of civil society in the response should include a
deeper analysis of the impact of particular institutional designs and modes
of participation on these features of civil society organizations.
As civil society scholar Michael Edwards has pointed out, "[a]n idea
that means everything probably means nothing . . . . At the very least,
clarity about the different understandings [of civil society] in play is neces-
sary if we are to have a sensible conversation . . . ."198 Clarification of
these shifting and internally inconsistent concepts of "civil society" and the
further disaggregation of the different civil society players according to
197. For example, the Guidelines for the Construction of Core Indicators published by
UNAIDS stress the importance of including a broad range of stakeholders in the national
response. Inclusion refers "not only to implementation and innovation, but also to issues of
public policy, advocacy and oversight functions, monitoring and evaluation." UNAIDS,
Clearing the Common Ground for the "Three Ones" (Conference Paper for Washington Con-
sultation Apr. 25, 2004), available at http://data.unaids.orgfUNA-docs/Three-OnesConsulta
tionReporten.pdf.
198. EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 3.
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their attributes (as shown in Figures 1 and 2) would help sharpen the de-
bate regarding the precise role of different actors in the global response
against HIV/AIDS.
C. Applying the Theoretical Framework: Consequences
for Institutional Design
This Section applies the elements disaggregated in Figures 1 and 2 to
the UNGASS process, shows how emphasis on different aspects of civil
society will lead to divergent institutional designs, and demonstrates how
current institutional arrangements will impact the relationship among civil
society, the state, and the international order.199 It focuses on two key
areas of disagreement among the theories of civil society described above:
(1) whether the market, and thus business organizations, should be consid-
ered part of civil society; and (2) whether the national and international
response should prioritize inward-looking, apolitical organizations or out-
ward-looking, politically oriented organizations. This Section illustrates
only some of the consequences of incorporating the disaggregated frame-
work illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 to an analysis of civil society. It is not
intended to describe all possible consequences for institutional design but
rather to illustrate some of the divergent institutional designs dictated by
emphases on different functions of civil society.
1. Inclusion of the Market in the Concept of Civil Society
As explored above, UNGASS documents are unclear regarding
whether the market should be included in the concept of civil society. In
practice, business representatives are part of the Civil Society Task Force
and pharmaceutical companies (as well as other corporations) are invited
to High-Level Meetings under the rubric of civil society.200 This means
that corporations can be active participants in the same round-table dis-
cussions and can address member states and observers at the day-long civil
society interactive hearings. 201 At the national level, the UNAIDS moni-
toring guidelines emphasize the importance of creating a single mul-
tisectoral AIDS-coordinating institution, but they appear agnostic as to
whether for-profit companies should be included as active members with a
certain amount of decision-making power.202 Member countries have
199. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2. & Table 1.
200. See, e.g., 2008 List of Civil Society Representatives, supra note 196 (listing Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Becton Dickinson and Company, among other private corporations invited to
the High Level Meetings as members of civil society).
201. For a description of the hearing, as well as a webcast and transcript of the 2008 and
2011 review sessions' selected civil society speakers, see 2008 High-Level Meeting on AIDS,
UNITED NATIONS (June 10-11, 2008), https://www.un.org/galaidsmeeting2008/ (follow "State-
ments and Webcasts" hyperlink) and 2011 High-Level Meeting on AIDS, UNITED NATIONS
(June 8-10, 2011), http://www.un.org/webcast/aidsmeeting2008/index.asp (follow "Statements
and Webcast" hyperlink).
202. UNAIDS, GLOBAL TASK TEAM ON IMPROVING AIDS COORDINATION AMONG
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS, FINAL REPORT (2005), availa-
ble at http://data.unaids.org[Publications/IRC-pub06/JC1125-GlobalTaskTeamReportsen.pdf;
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taken different approaches to constructing such a coordinating body. For
example, Nicaragua's National AIDS Council does not include private,
for-profit entities, while Brazil's does. 2 0 3
In the context of the global fight against HIV/AIDS, it is undisputed
that international corporations, and in particular pharmaceutical compa-
nies, are key stakeholders that play a role in the response. As researchers
and manufacturers of HIV/AIDS cocktail drugs, pharmaceutical price-set-
ting practices have a large impact on access to medicines in the developing
world, as do their decisions to enforce international patents against foreign
governments. 204 Thus, including pharmaceutical companies in interna-
tional and national debates about the global HIV/AIDS epidemic is gener-
ally considered essential. 205 It may thus appear that concerns as to
whether the concept of civil society is broad enough to include pharma-
ceutical companies reflect purely theoretical debates with little practical
relevance.
Indeed, neoliberal, social capital, and civic republican theories of civil
society tend to emphasize the oppositional relationship of civil society and
the state, but leave unexplored and unproblematized the relationship be-
tween civil society and the market. 206 Similarly, new governance theory,
while distinguishing between civil society and the market, tends to presup-
pose a positive and complementary relationship between the two, whereby
market and civil society actors are "partners" in implementation and mon-
UNAIDS, National AIDS Programmes: A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluation, at 20,
UNAIDS/00.17.E (June 2000), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/en/
JC427-MonEv-Full-en.pdf ("The more diffuse the response, the more important it becomes
to have a strong centrally coordinated M&E system to which each sector can contribute
information."); UNAIDS, "Three Ones" Key Principles 1 (Conference Paper for Washington
Consultation Apr. 25, 2004), [hereinafter UNAIDS, Three Ones Key Principles], available at
http://data.unaids.org/una-docs/three-oneskeyprinciplesen.pdf (advocating for the creation
of "One National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad based multi-sector mandate").
203. 2008 National Composite Policy Index (NCPI) Reports, UNAIDS, http://www.un
aids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/CountryProgress/2008-NCPI-reports.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2013) (listing specific information on national multisector AIDS programs for
participating countries); see also, MIGUEL OROZCO & LAURA G. PEDRAZA FARIRA, HIV/
AIDS POLICY IN NICARAGUA: A CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVE (2007), available at http://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/nicaragua_20080115.pdf.
204. For a discussion on the role of pharmaceutical companies in access to essential
medicines in the developing world, see generally OBIJOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH
GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2005) and
HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND Ac-
CESS TO MEDICINES (2007).
205. See, e.g., Peter Piot & Awa Marie Coll Seck, International Response to the HIVI
AIDS Epidemic: Planning for Success, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1106, 1109 (2001)
(documenting how dialogue between countries and the pharmaceutical industry "led to wide-
spread support for preferential drug pricing for developing countries, pricing transparency,
[and] price competition").
206. See JUDE HOWELL & JENNY PEARCE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT 63
(2001) (noting that "[tihe anti-state model of civil society ... leads to a tendency among
donors to assume rather than query the relationship between civil society and the market, so
failing to explore critically the tensions and contradictions implicit in this relationship").
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itoring efforts.207 It is precisely this latter theoretical understanding of civil
society that appears to implicitly undergird the UNGASS Civil Society
Task Force and other UNGASS civil society initiatives, which tend to em-
phasize partnerships and mutual cooperation among nonstate and state
actors.
Nevertheless, much like differentiating the realm of the state (with its
monopoly on the use of legal force) from that of civil society (as the realm
of voluntary interactions) creates a useful conceptual distinction that al-
lows us to think of civil society as a "watchdog" of governmental activi-
ties,208 differentiating the market from civil society could reveal
oppositional relationships between civil society and business entities or
nonprofit organizations that advocate on their behalf; bring to the surface
conflicts of interest; and allow civil society to play a critical watchdog role
vis-A-vis the market. Moreover, if, like Habermasian critical scholars, we
understand civil society organizations to be focused on the production and
transmission of meaning through communication and debate, rather than
profit-making, it is important to differentiate those associations organized
around communication and debate from those whose ultimate goal is to
secure profits.209
A critical and oppositional role of civil society vis-A-vis the market is
particularly relevant in the area of HIV/AIDS, where pharmaceutical
companies have engaged in aggressive patenting tactics, for example, by
suing developing countries that issued compulsory licenses to several es-
sential medicines. 210 Thus, conceptualizing businesses, nonprofit organiza-
tions that represent business interests (such as the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations), 211 and other
207. See Lobel, supra note 161, at 377 ("In a cooperative regime, the role of govern-
ment changes from regulator and controller to facilitator, and law becomes a shared prob-
lem-solving process rather than an ordering activity. Government, industry, and civil society
groups all share responsibility for achieving policy goals. Industry is expected to participate
as part of a search for common goals, not just rigidly asserting its narrow economic or politi-
cal interests.") (internal citation omitted).
208. See, e.g., HOWELL & PEARCE, supra note206, at 81 ("[T]he conceptual separation
of civil society from the state was important, not only because it more accurately reflected
empirical reality but also because it made possible the protection of this space to challenge
state despotism.").
209. As emphasized by Nancy Fraser, conceptualizing civil society as a "theater for ...
deliberating rather than for buying and selling, . . . permits us to keep in view the distinctions
between state apparatuses, economic markets, and democratic associations, distinctions that
are essential to democratic theory." Fraser, supra note 32, at 57. This understanding of civil
society emphasizes those organizations involved in outward-looking deliberation intended to
impact policy outcomes. The critical position tends to deemphasize inward-looking civil soci-
ety organizations, such as choral societies, as less central to democratic theory.
210. See, e.g., Andrew Clark & Julian Borger, Cheaper Drugs for Africa, THE GUARD-
IAN, Mar. 14, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/mar/15/aids.andrewclark; Press Re-
lease, M6decins Sans Frontibres, Indian Court Ruling in Novartis Case Protects India as the
'Pharmacy of the Developing World' (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.doctorswithout
borders.org/press/release.cfm?id=2096.
211. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations has
NGO consultative status before the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NGOs
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civil society organizations (such as groups of people living with HIV/
AIDS) as "partners" in a shared implementation enterprise risks de-
politicizing civil society and obscuring its potential role as critic and
watchdog.
2. Monitoring Process Design
Emphasis on particular inward- or outward-looking functions of civil
society will have consequences for the design of monitoring regimes. Mar-
ket liberal theorists favor strategies of delegation.212 In this model, interna-
tional organizations and national governments would delegate the
collection of data and the preparation of a single monitoring report to
apolitical, independent civil society actors. Because market-style competi-
tion is thought to increase efficiency and decrease rent-seeking, a delega-
tion model should ensure that selection of monitoring providers takes
place through a competitive process. For example, the state and/or
UNAIDS could call for monitoring proposals and choose to fund the
"best" proposals, evaluated using a set of predefined criteria. The UN-
GASS monitoring process as currently designed requires states to submit
official monitoring reports to UNAIDS and encourages the creation of a
"National HIV/AIDS Coordinating Authority" (NACA) to develop a na-
tional monitoring and implementation system but is silent as to how NA-
CAs implement their monitoring duties.213
If the organization or organizations that are chosen to carry out the
monitoring report are perceived as legitimate and independent, this model
may mitigate claims that the state, in drafting the monitoring report, has
favored some groups while failing to include the views of others. It may
also justify discouraging the submission of shadow reports to the interna-
tional monitoring body-the current UNAIDS approach-as third-party
monitoring reports would have built-in independence. A market liberal
approach to monitoring design, however, also has several drawbacks. First,
it threatens to depoliticize civil society by turning the monitoring process
into a technocratic exercise, rather than an opportunity for civil society
organizations to critique state and market action and formulate alternative
proposals. Second, a market liberal theory does not provide a space for
politically motivated social movements, NGOs, or other advocacy organi-
zations to act as critics and watchdogs. But arguably social movements or
advocacy NGOs may be better able (and better motivated) to call atten-
in Consultative States with ECOSOC, INFORMATION HABITAT, http://habitat.igc.org/ngo-rev/
status.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). It represents "the research-based pharmaceutical in-
dustry, including the biotechnology and vaccine sectors." About IFPMA, INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & AssOCIATIONS, http://www.ifpma.
org/about-ifpmalwelcome.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
212. See supra Part I.E.1.a.
213. See, e.g., UNAIDS, Three Ones Key Principles, supra note 202, at 1 (advocating for
the creation of "One National AIDS Coordinating Authority, with a broad based multi-sec-
tor mandate").
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tion to the government's shortcomings than a monitoring system adminis-
tered by an apolitical body.214
Civic republican and social capital theories similarly tend to favor
strategies that discourage the direct participation of politically motivated
actors. But rather than delegate monitoring to private actors, these theo-
rists favor strategies that foster deliberation in government while isolating
these deliberative spaces from the direct influence of advocacy groups. In
the context of monitoring design, these theories counsel deference to the
state. An institutional design that emphasizes deference would place the
state as the leader of the response. Monitoring the degree and effective-
ness of the national response, including the degree of civil society partici-
pation, would take place largely through state self-reporting. In practice,
self-reporting could be carried out by a specialized body within govern-
ment, for example by a group of experts in the Ministry of Health. Civil
society would participate in the response through established channels of
communication with the governmental body in charge of monitoring. For
example, the monitoring body could hold consultation meetings with civil
society representatives prior to drafting the report, or set up an advice and
comment period whereby civil society could evaluate the proposed moni-
toring report, or establish contestatory mechanisms through which the
public could challenge the government's draft monitoring report. In the
context of UNGASS monitoring, a civic republican or social capital ap-
proach would place NACAs within a government agency, rather than as a
stand-alone body open to the participation of multiple stakeholders.
UNAIDS would encourage the submission of a single report drafted by
the NACA.
Channeling civil society participation through the national state, with
effective mechanisms for contestation and consultation, has the advantage
of pressing national governments to assume political leadership in the re-
sponse against HIV/AIDS. In practice, however, state mechanisms for
contestation and consultation are likely to be easily abused in weaker de-
mocracies or authoritarian regimes, and thus a monitoring system based
on deference by the state may provide too few outlets for advocacy organi-
zations to bring their grievances to light.215
Additionally, a civil society theory in which inner-looking goals and
the creation of social capital take center stage may depoliticize civil society
by relegating political advocacy organizations to the background and by
214. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 165-66 (1984)
(describing the "fire alarm" model of oversight as relying on citizens and organized interest
groups to "sound the alarm" when a particular policy is harming their interests, and explain-
ing how it can be a more efficient way to police compliance than direct governmental
oversight).
215. A modified deference structure that allows civil society organizations to submit
shadow monitoring reports when they feel strongly that their views were not taken into ac-
count in the national consultation process may be one way to address this shortcoming. This,
in fact, is the structure that the UNGASS monitoring system currently favors.
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conceptualizing civil society solely in instrumentalist terms, that is, as a
means to increase social capital and civic virtue.216
In contrast, a focus on civil society functions at the inward-outward
boundary-as emphasized by feminist, Third World, and minority theo-
ries-would seek the creation of multiple deliberative spaces and enact
procedures that incorporate the use of alternative modes of deliberation,
thus favoring strategies of inclusion. As described above, these spaces can
serve a dual purpose where social groups (and in particular subordinated
or minority groups) both develop their "identities, interests, and needs"
and deliberate about and formulate alternative and often contestatory in-
terpretations of accepted norms.217 A UNAIDS monitoring regime that
encourages the drafting of shadow reports, lowers the technical expertise
necessary to fill out the report questionnaire, allows narrative styles of
reporting, and changes reporting guidelines to give civil society organiza-
tions ample opportunity to make comments about specific instances of
government failure or abuse would not only encourage the contestatory
function of civil society, but may also encourage the formation of civil so-
ciety associations that represent minority interests.218 An inward-outward
focus may also counsel the creation of new national or international insti-
tutions to coordinate broader access to the international monitoring pro-
cess by, for example, conducting outreach activities and encouraging
participation by underrepresented publics.
A reporting process open to different modes of participation, how-
ever, raises efficiency and coordination concerns. Standardized reporting
guidelines are streamlined to facilitate comparison among countries. Mul-
tiple forms of reporting, and in particular narrative reporting, would re-
quire an investment on the part of UNAIDS to synthesize multiple
independent reports into a single global report. Additionally, without a
mechanism to evaluate the validity of each civil society organization's
claims, it will be hard to determine which reports contain credible critiques
of state conduct. Nevertheless, because it would encourage a broad group
of individuals and associations to voice their independent complaints, a
model that allows multiple shadow reports would at the very least fulfill an
expressive function, empowering individual group members in a manner
similar to having one's day in court. Additionally, the ability to directly
participate in the creation of a civil society report would also serve an
educative function, raising civil society awareness of the UNGASS com-
mitments themselves.
A focus on the outward-looking functions of civil society as watchdog
and critic-as emphasized by Habermasian critical scholars-would coun-
216. For a criticism of the use of the concept of social capital in development, see gener-
ally JOHN HARRIss, DEPOLITICIZING DEVELOPMENT: THE WORLD BANK AND SOCIAL CAPI-
TAL (2002).
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
218. UNGASS monitoring templates currently do not leave much space for comments,
and are designed largely as a questionnaire with a limited set of possible answer choices. See
UNAIDS, 2009 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, apps.
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sel a monitoring regime that seeks to obtain up-to-date, on-the-ground in-
formation from civil society organizations to critique state performance.
The monitoring process would thus be organized around strategies of con-
testation. In this context, interactions between monitoring bodies and local
civil society organizations may be mediated by larger, more established
umbrella or key intermediary organizations with the capacity to carry out
field research and produce a technical shadow report that critically evalu-
ates the governments' progress. For example, a civil society coordinating
forum outside the state where civil society organizations come together
and debate public policy, acting in a manner similar to the National HIV/
AIDS Coordinating Authority, could coordinate the drafting of civil soci-
ety's shadow report. This type of interaction is likely to favor associations
organized for civic or political goals, in particular national NGOs, which
are likely to have the capacity to engage in systematic analyses of the gov-
ernmental response.
A monitoring regime that favors the submission of critical shadow re-
ports would facilitate what has been termed the "boomerang pattern" of
state influence. 219 In this model, civil society organizations that do not
have access to state channels at home would air their grievances against
their state before international institutions, other member states, and
transnational or foreign civil society organizations. International organiza-
tions would then put direct pressure on the noncompliant state, aided by
transnational civil society networks. Nevertheless, because this approach is
likely to privilege established NGOs over social movements, or other
grassroots local associations, it is particularly vulnerable to the critiques of
NGOization discussed above.
Finally, a focus on the boundary-crossing function of civil society that
emphasizes mechanisms of coordination between civil society and the
state would counsel a monitoring mechanism that relies on strategies of
collaboration. New governance scholars in particular have employed a va-
riety of institutional arrangements that allow civil society to participate
directly in policy monitoring and implementation. Direct civil society par-
ticipation could be accomplished by the creation of an independent regula-
tory organ composed of a mixture of civil society, business, and
government representatives tasked with authoring the monitoring report.
Ad hoc or institutionalized consultation processes could also involve civil
society in decision making. 220
This approach is vulnerable to the critique that powerful interest
groups may unduly influence the monitoring process, and that the close
cooperation between government and civil society associations may coopt
the political role of civil society thereby threatening its ability to remain a
219. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, AcrivISTs BEYOND BORDERS: ADVO-
CACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 12-13 (1998).
220. For a discussion and analysis of the different types of new governance initiatives
that have been employed in the European Union, see Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek,
Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J.
1 (2002).
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critic of government action. Thus, participatory civil society-government
institutions also require safeguards against clientelism, for example, by in-
stitutionalizing strong deliberation processes, or the rotation of civil soci-
ety groups that participate in the debate.221 These safeguards, and in
particular rotation protocols for civil society, may also mitigate the risk of
cooptation.
These five approaches to monitoring design-delegation, deference, in-
clusion, contestation, and collaboration-as well as the corresponding the-
oretical justifications and critiques, are diagrammed below in Table 1.
D. UNGASS's Implicit Theoretical Underpinnings
Implicit in UNGASS's current institutional design is a new govern-
ance conception of civil society that underscores strategies of collabora-
tion and views civil society actors principally as "partners" of both
government and business entities. To foster coordination at the national
level, UNGASS advocates a tripartite coordination framework.222 This
framework conceives of civil society participation as serving mainly an in-
strumental role: to optimize the use of resources and improve the national
response to AIDS. 223 Civil society (and other relevant stakeholder) input
is incorporated into a single collaboratively written monitoring report.224
Shadow reports are discouraged. 225 A decrease in the number of civil soci-
ety organizations seeking to file independent shadow reports is regarded
as an indication of high levels of national collaboration. 226
221. See Paul Magnette, European Governance and Civic Participation: Can the Euro-
pean Union be Politicised? (Jean Monnet Program Working Paper No. 6/01, 2001), available
at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/01/010901.html.
222. In April 2004, the Consultation on Harmonization of International AIDS Fund-
ing-bringing together representatives from governments, donors, international organiza-
tions, and civil society-endorsed the "Three Ones" principles: "[o]ne agreed AIDS action
framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners," "[o]ne national
AIDS coordinating authority," and "[o]ne agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation
system." UNAIDS was called to act as facilitator and mediator in efforts to realize these
principles. UNAIDS, The "Three Ones" in Action: Where We Are and Where We Go from
Here, UNAIDS/05.08E (May 2005), available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub06/
jc935-3onesinactionen.pdf.
223. Id.
224. UNAIDS, 2011 Core Indicator Guidelines, supra note 180, at 15 ("Wherever possi-
ble UNAIDS encourages civil society integration into national reporting processes. . . .
Shadow reports are intended to provide an alternative perspective where it is strongly felt
that civil society was not adequately included in the national reporting process, where gov-
ernments do not submit a Country Progress Report, or where data provided by government
differs considerably from data collected by civil society monitoring government progress in
service delivery.").
225. Id.
226. Much Progress to Report: UNGASS 2008, UNAIDS (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.
unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2008/marchl20080312countryprogress/
("There has been a significant drop in number of shadow reports submitted to UNAIDS,
reflecting the substantial efforts in many countries to increase the engagement of civil society
in national reporting processes.").
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Typology Theory Priorities Justification Monitoring Critique
Design
Outward- Habermasian Associations Key purpose of Contestation: NGOization:
looking Critical formally civil society is to Single "shadow" privileges
organized for preserve monitoring report established
political democracy by by civil society. NGOs.
advocacy. acting as watchdog Create space Excessive focus
and critic vis-A-vis outside on single
the state and the parliamentary and deliberative
market. judicial bodies space may
where civil society exclude
associations disadvantaged,





Civil New Associations Civil society actors Collaboration: Clientelism.
Society/ Governance organized for as partners in Single monitoring Moderation of
State and political lawmaking and report authored by critique;
Boundary- State-society advocacy and implementation. consortium of all cooptation.
crossing synergy with requisite stakeholders.
technical
_expertise
A drop in shadow report submissions has, however, several other pos-
sible interpretations. It may merely reflect the fact that minority voices
lack the capacity and opportunity to develop alternative and contestatory
views of the national HIV/AIDS response; that organized civil society
groups that disagree with the content of the official state report have
opted-out of a monitoring process they no longer view as legitimate; or
even that the government has abdicated its responsibilities under UN-
GASS so that certain civil society groups run the show. Focusing on civil
society's role as an innovator and a partner with stakeholders as varied as
for-profit entities and state administrative agencies can obscure opposi-
tional relationships between civil society and market actors; between civil
society and the state; between civil society and international organizations
(such as UNAIDS or WHO); and even between different organizations
within civil society. Further, a discourse of cooperation and shared goals is
likely to lead to the muting of critique both by a self-selection process
(whereby those civil society actors who most agree with governmental or
UNGASS policies are more likely to join the collaborative project) and by
the progressive marginalization of dissenting (and often disrupting) voices
from the "collaboration" table.
In other words, the current UNGASS institutional design is likely to
dampen the contestatory function of civil society. But, as I argue in more
detail in the next Part of this Article, it is precisely this function of civil
society-together with its role as a space to nurture the emergence of al-
ternative, minority views-that can ultimately lend legitimacy to the UN-
GASS project by allowing potential disagreements about its proper
purposes and goals to be both aired and potentially resolved. Its legitimacy
is important not only because, as a general matter, legitimacy is a critical
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element in motivating compliance, but also because in the particular case
of HIV/AIDS regulation what constitutes normative legitimacy is likely to
be highly contested, at least in some areas. For example, pharmaceutical
companies are likely to have different views from those of people living
with HIV/AIDS on whether UNGASS should advocate the issuance of
compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs or promote other measures to
lower their price to consumers; and religious organizations are likely to
differ from reproductive-rights NGOs on the content of sex-education
campaigns, including whether a focus on condom use should be the linch-
pin of efforts to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The next Section explores this argument in depth and develops several
normative implications of the analytical framework. In particular, it pro-
poses that a capacious interpretation of a Habermasian theory of civil soci-
ety is best suited to explain and justify a role for civil society in lawmaking
and implementation as increasing the legitimacy and accountability of in-
ternational organizations.
III. TOWARD A MODEL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Inclusion of civil society in international lawmaking and national im-
plementation is often justified on the grounds that civil society participa-
tion lends legitimacy to international organizations. 227 This view of civil
society as increasing the legitimacy of both international organizations and
implementing states is by no means uncontested. To the contrary, one of
the most divisive arguments in the legal literature on international organi-
zations concerns whether civil society participation is legitimacy enhancing
or a self-serving exercise in rent-seeking.228
My own view is that debates on civil society's contribution to the legit-
imacy of international organizations are confounded by different underly-
ing conceptions of civil society that are never explicitly articulated or
explored. The civil society framework I developed in Part I can illuminate
these different understandings. It can also contribute to the debate by sug-
gesting that an outward-looking theory of civil society, based on a capa-
cious reading of Habermasian critical theory, can best explain and justify a
legitimizing role for civil society participation.
227. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
228. Compare Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 894 ("In my view, the value-added from
NGOs on the international plane is that they correct for the pathologies of governments and
IOs [International Organizations]."), with Bolton, supra note 17, at 221 (describing globalism
as "a kind of worldwide cartelization of governments and interest groups").
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A. The Legitimacy Problem of International Organizations
1. State Delegation and the Democratic Deficit of
International Organizations
State delegation of decision making and enforcement capabilities to
international institutions has conferred upon them public powers229 that
both constrain state sovereignty and affect the well-being and opportuni-
ties of citizens everywhere. 230 International organizations, however, are
not subject to the same mechanisms of democratic accountability as are
territorially-bound nation-states. That is, international organizations do
not possess the institutions of modern representative democratic systems,
including a constitutional structure and electoral processes, which are
widely held to legitimate the exercise of public power by sovereign states.
In short, international organizations suffer from what is often referred to
as a "democratic deficit": no global elections, no global parliament, and no
global constitution constrain their public power.231
Delegation provides a measure of legitimacy to the actions of interna-
tional organizations by formally holding them accountable to the delegat-
ing states. Nevertheless, the long chains of delegation-the great distance
between national publics and supranational bodies-together with the ab-
sence of a robust international system of checks and balances significantly
weakens claims to legitimacy through delegation. 232 Most importantly,
229. Public power refers to "those forms of power that are the legitimate subject of
democratic control." Kate Macdonald & Terry Macdonald, Democracy in a Pluralist Global
Order: Corporate Power and Stakeholder Representation, 24 ETHICS & INT'L Ave. 19, 21
(2010).
230. A number of articles have harnessed empirical evidence to make a convincing case
that international organizations are increasingly exercising authority as autonomous decision-
makers. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 19, at 586 ("Most of the states of the world cannot, on
their own or even with the aid of their closest allies, expect to control the standard-setting
practices of . . . [International Organizations such as] the Security Council . . . [and] the
IMF."); Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 23, at 406-07 (arguing that international institu-
tions are "like governments in that they issue rules and publicly attach significant conse-
quences to compliance or failure to comply with them-and claim the authority to do so" and
noting that several global institutions affect domestic policy and "limit the exercise of sover-
eignty by democratic states"); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer/Autumn
2005, at 15, 18. But cf Andrew Guzman & Jennifer Landslide, The Myth of International
Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (2008) (arguing that "international delegation is not
something we need worry too much about" because it "tends to be highly constrained and/or
involve highly technical matters").
231. See CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A
CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? (Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling & Patrizia Nanz eds.,
2008); Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be democratic? A Skeptic's View, in
DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999); Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., Globalization's Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More Ac-
countable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. July/Aug. 2001, at 2, 2.
232. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and
Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2003) ("By transferring legal authority
from US actors to international actors-actors that are physically and culturally more distant
from, and not directly responsible to, the US electorate-these delegations may entail a dilu-
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delegation within a nation-state involves both elected and unelected offi-
cials who share the same public constituency. This allows accountability
relationships to flow directly from the public through elected officials to
their agents, thus minimizing-although not eliminating-potential princi-
pal-agent problems. 2 3 3 But this relationship does not hold for interna-
tional organizations, whose decisions impact a range of individuals
belonging to multiple political jurisdictions. Multiple accountability rela-
tionships are likely to generate conflicting demands on international orga-
nizations, thus ultimately diminishing the ability of democratic nation-
states to self-govern, because citizens within nation-states will likely be
bound by some rules over which they had no say. For these reasons, state
delegation provides only a very thin basis on which to defend the norma-
tive democratic legitimacy of international organizations. 234
2. The Legitimacy Debate: Celebratory vs. Skeptical
Views of Civil Society
A large part of the debate surrounding the legitimacy of international
organizations has been framed around this democratic deficit. 235 The
tion of domestic political accountability."); Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 23, at 414-15
(arguing that state consent sufficient for legitimacy cannot be provided through the long
chains of delegation that separate most global governance institutions from democratic pub-
lics); Daniel Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1502-05 (2006) ("As a general matter, the legitimacy of decision-
making becomes more strained as the sense of community thins and the distance between
those exercising authority and the public grows. This problem is especially acute in the inter-
national setting, as the distance is not just physical but may also reflect deep differences in
perspectives, assumptions, and values.").
233. See, e.g., Roland Vaubel, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations,
1 REV. INT'L ORG. 125, 126-27 (2006) (explaining that global governance institutions exacer-
bate principal-agent problems because international organizations often have vested interests
that differ from those of voters in national states, and because these voters are either "ration-
ally ignorant of most of the activities of international organizations and/or lack the power to
impose their will").
234. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 232, at 1504-05 (remaking that delegations of authority
within a nation state are legitimate in part because a nation state can be understood as com-
posed of a single political community with "[a] shared sense of common destiny"); Jed
Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 2020 (2004) ("The
whole point of international law, in its present form, is to supersede the outcomes of political
processes, including democratic processes. If, therefore, Americans remain committed to
self-government, they do in fact have reason to resist international governance today.");
Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 230, at 26 ("The rise of regulatory programs at the
global level ... enjoy too much de facto independence and discretion to be regarded as mere
agents of states.").
235. Compare Kenneth Anderson, "Accountability" as "Legitimacy": Global Govern-
ance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 841, 868 (2011)
("Legitimacy in a democracy is given by people raising their hands and voting-not by the
presence of citizens or activist groups as civil society, however important they may be to
articulating versions of a society's politics."), with Peters, supra note 16, at 318 ("The legiti-
macy gains of NGO involvement are apt to outweigh the legitimacy problems. Overall, a
further democratization of the international legal order requires that the participation of
NGOs in law-making and law-enforcement be strengthened.").
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question thus has been whether global institutions can approximate the
ideal of democracy as it has evolved to constrain sovereign states. In this
interpretation, legitimacy-understood in its normative sense as having
the right to rule-is synonymous with democracy, and most often with
electoral democracy. 236 Scholars who have adopted this view, either im-
plicitly or explicitly, tend to analyze civil society in terms of whether it can
serve to "cure" the democratic deficit of international organizations. 237 A
celebratory view of civil society calls into question the continuing primacy
of states in international lawmaking, and advocates for a more prominent
role for "global civil society." 238 In this context, the participation of global
civil society in international decision making and enforcement is thought
to play a legitimizing function by channeling the concerns of those com-
munities likely to be affected by the decisions of international organiza-
tions.239 In contrast, under an opposing, skeptical view, civil society
organizations exacerbate, rather than cure, the democratic deficit. In this
view, civil society participation is not a cure for the democratic deficit,
because civil society cannot be properly construed as representing a global
public to which international organizations should be held accountable. 240
This position tends to conceptualize civil society organizations as self-in-
terested groups whose interactions with international organizations serve
to extract rents to promote their self-interests. 241 From this view tend to
236. Compare Anderson, supra note 235, with Peters, supra note ????.
237. See, e.g., CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE, supra note 231 (detailing several instances in which deficiencies in democratic values
are recognized in an attempt to understand and remedy those faults); Magdalena Bexell,
Jonas Tallberg & Anders Uhlin, Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls
of Transnational Actors, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 81, 81 (2010); Jan Aart Scholte, Civil
Society and Democracy in Global Governance, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 281, 281 (2002).
238. See, e.g., Richard Falk, Reforming the United Nations: Global Civil Society Perspec-
tives and Initiatives, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2005-2006, 150 (Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor
& Helmut Anheier, eds., 2006); James Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globaliz-
ing World, in REIMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 28 (Daniele Archibugi, David Held &
Martin Kohler eds., 1998); Karin BAckstrand, Democratizing Global Environmental Govern-
ance? Stakeholder Democracy After the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 12 EUR.
J. Iwr'L REL. 467, 493-94 (2006) (arguing that "stakeholder democracy" that moves beyond
mere participation to collaboration and truer deliberation among states, business, and civil
society can partially cure the democratic deficit of international organizations).
239. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 238; Rosenau, supra note 238; Backstrand, supra note
238.
240. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, "Global Civil Society": A Sceptical
View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004-2005 26, 37 (Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier & Marlies
Glasius eds., 2004) (arguing that "the 'democracy deficit' of the international system is but-
tressed rather than challenged by the global civil society movement"); Gabriella Blum, Bilat-
eralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323,
364 (2008) ("Private and nongovernmental actors involved in international treaty-making
belong to a very specific subset of the international community. Men influence it more than
women; the rich have a much more vocal presence than the poor; and some cultural tenets
dominate it at the expense of others.") (internal citations omitted).
241. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 235, at 859 ("As a theoretical matter, however,
NGOs, merely as such, are what they are-simply organizations consisting of interested indi-
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flow policy prescriptions that seek to narrow the reach of international
law, in particular by eschewing any robust international laW242 claims of
authority to regulate matters within states.243
3. Implicit Conceptions of Civil Society in Celebratory
and Skeptical Views
Implicit in both the celebratory and skeptical positions are different
conceptions of civil society, which the framework developed in Part I can
help illuminate. Celebratory approaches to civil society, although diverse,
have tended to converge on postulating a role for civil society organiza-
tions as "partners" with international organizations and other stakeholders
(notably, businesses). This approach is most salient in some of the efforts
to involve civil society in EU governance.244 This conceptualization of civil
society as "partners" in a horizontal relationship with business and inter-
national organizations corresponds roughly to a boundary-crossing func-
tion of civil society. In particular, under a new governance approach, civil
society is thought to contribute to democratic legitimacy by participating
in a joint "democratic experimentalism" project. New governance scholars
argue that democratic experimentalism will lead to better policies by fit-
ting local solutions to local problems, and to more efficient implementa-
tion by relying on private actors.245
The problem with new governance approaches to civil society is that
in practice they tend to sideline deliberation about underlying disagree-
ments on fundamental norms. Rather, new governance scholars generally
assume agreement regarding the proper scope and content of implementa-
tion measures and focus on decentralization and local public-private part-
viduals . .. that attempt to persuade international organizations, states, or others in authority,
to act .... ); Bolton, supra note 17, at 221.
242. By robust international law, I mean those areas of international law, such as
human rights law and parts of environmental and trade law, that purport to regulate state
conduct previously thought to be the exclusive province of sovereign states.
243. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12 (arguing that democratic states
have an obligation to place their sovereign interests before any rules of international law that
threaten states' right to govern themselves free from foreign interference); Kenneth Ander-
son, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmen-
tal Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 103
(2000); Dahl, supra note 231, at 33-34 (conceptualizing International Organizations as
nondemocratic "bureaucratic bargaining systems" and arguing that "[w]e should be wary of
ceding the legitimacy of democracy to non-democratic systems" whose "'democratic deficit"'
is "a likely cost of all international governments."); John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democ-
racy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2009) (argu-
ing against a robust version of international law because "the institutions interpreting
[human rights] norms are not democratic, but bureaucratic and oligarchic and, thus, often
hostile to basic economic and personal liberties").
244. See, e.g., Gr~inne de Bdrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in
the European Union, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 403, 412-23, 422 (2003).
245. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Exper-
imentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 338-39 (1998).
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nerships in finding innovative ways to effectuate them.2 4 6 New governance
approaches often do not differentiate business from civil society, concep-
tualizing both groups as "stakeholders" that participate in the joint gov-
ernance project.247 Relatedly, conceptualizing civil society as a partner
with government and business threatens to dilute or coopt civil society's
political role and, as a consequence, its ability to contest dominant norms
and develop alternatives. But articulating, defending, and ultimately (at
least in some cases) reaching consensus on substantive views about what
the goals of a particular institution should be are, in my view, key aspects
of a theory of civil society that can envision civil society as contributing to
the legitimacy of international organizations. Finally, the most salient
problem of new governance approaches is that they risk magnifying the
preferences of small groups that can exert great political power, thus de
facto institutionalizing rent-seeking behavior.248 This latter critique is re-
flected in writings by civil society critics who comment on the fact that civil
society as conceived by international organizations often consists of
"global elites, including those in international NGOs." 249
In contrast, skeptics, among them civic republicans and market liber-
als, view civil society with an inward-looking perspective that is suspicious
of associations organized for explicitly political purposes. Civic Republi-
cans believe that democratic legitimacy depends on deliberation in gov-
ernment, free from the direct influence of civil society. More specifically,
at the national level (for example, in the national implementation of inter-
national norms) this implies relying on parliamentary or judiciary
processes to filter society's preferences, rather than allowing direct gov-
ernment lobbying by civil society organizations. At the international level,
this means either attempting to replicate structures of civic republican gov-
ernment at an international scale (for example through the creation of a
global parliament) or recognizing that civil society participation must be
channeled through sovereign state structures. The latter is indeed the posi-
tion taken by many civil society skeptics.250 Market liberals deal with the
perceived threat of special interest groups by limiting the reach of bureau-
cratic power of both national and supranational government institutions.
Such an approach counsels strategies of delegation (both at the national
246. See David A. Super, Laboratories Of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism
And The Failure Of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553-60 (2008).
247. See, e.g., Grdinne de Bilrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduc-
tion, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 227, 235-37 (2010).
248. See, e.g., Super, supra note 246, at 550 n.26, 564-65. (criticizing new governance
approaches as leading to "dialogue among representatives (albeit unelected ones) of various
interest groups rather than among the citizenry itself").
249. See Anderson, supra note 235, at 845.
250. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 Ir'L AFF. 1,
29 (2001) ("To give NGOs a second shot independent of the governments which they have
elected has no rationale."); Bolton, supra note 17, at 217 ("Civil society's 'second bite at the
apple' [i.e. its purported ability to lobby both national governments and international organi-
zations] raises profoundly troubling questions of democratic theory that its advocates have
almost entirely elided.").
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and international levels) to apolitical civil society organizations coordi-
nated through market competition, unless market failure requires govern-
mental intervention. 251 Competitive markets are thought to legitimate the
authority of both nonstate actors and governments by holding them ac-
countable to efficient outcomes.252
Civic republican and market liberal approaches, as different as they
are in their conception of what constitutes a legitimate government, agree
that civil society associations organized for political purposes cannot con-
tribute, and furthermore are bound to imperil, normative legitimacy. Both
theories suppose that direct involvement of civil society in politics in-
creases factional politics driven by self-interest. But, as illustrated in Part I,
an inward-looking conception of civil society, with its concomitant skepti-
cism of politically motivated groups, is only one lens through which to
analyze civil society. As I argue in the next Section, an outward-looking
conception of civil society may indeed open avenues to imagine how civil
society could be a legitimate participant in international lawmaking and
implementation.
4. The Importance of Normative Legitimacy for
International Organizations
Civil society skeptics tend to equate legitimacy with democratic legiti-
macy effectuated through electoral processes. If legitimacy requires global
elections, then global institutions in their present form are not legitimate.
But unless we are willing to give up on global governance institutions ever
achieving normative legitimacy-and I argue we should not-this concep-
tion of legitimacy is too narrow for global institutions. Legitimacy is im-
portant for pragmatic reasons: if we wish to reap the benefits of
coordination that international institutions promise, international institu-
tions must enjoy ongoing public support in implementing countries. 253 Le-
gitimacy is also important for normative reasons: as international
organizations exert increasing authority that constrains state and individ-
ual action, a conception of what the legitimacy of global institutions re-
quires is needed to justify this burgeoning authority. It is important to
recognize that legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing proposition: the lack of
251. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determina-
tion: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 155-157
(1977-78) (describing a "market failure" account of government).
252. See, e.g., id. at 152. Markets, however, are not a democratic form of legitimacy
since unequally distributed capital counts as "votes."
253. Public support for international organizations need not be grounded on normative
legitimacy; rather, the belief that a particular organization is legitimate may be sufficient to
induce compliance. Sociological legitimacy, however, is bound to be strongest and more sta-
ble when it overlaps with normative legitimacy because people are more likely to consistently
follow rules that emanate from institutions whose basic normative underpinnings they agree
with. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 23, at 410 (arguing that moral reasons for sup-
porting international institutions are preferable to those based purely on self-interest because
"as a matter of psychological fact, moral reasons matter when we try to determine what
practical attitudes should be taken toward particular institutional arrangements").
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an elected global parliament does not mean that international organiza-
tions cannot be rendered more responsive to the concerns of those who
are affected by their policies, or that civil society cannot perform a valua-
ble contestatory function. 254
Moreover, international law scholars are increasingly arguing against
equating the legitimacy of global institutions to democratic electoral legiti-
macy. Those involved in the global administrative law project, such as
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, and Daniel Esty, view
global institutions through an administrative law lens, arguing that "much
of global governance can be understood and analyzed as administrative
action."255 These scholars aim to reduce "legitimacy deficits" of interna-
tional institutions by incorporating domestic administrative law principles
into international organizations and by developing new mechanisms of ad-
ministrative law at the global level. 2 5 6 Global administrative law ap-
proaches to legitimacy emphasize the importance of procedural, often
technocratic legitimacy, leaving aside debates regarding the democratic le-
gitimacy of global institutions. A second group of scholars, such as Allan
Buchanan, Robert Keohane, Joshua Cohen, and Charles Sabel, while rec-
ognizing that electoral democracy is not the only means whereby interna-
tional organizations can gain legitimacy, underscore the importance of
addressing concerns about the democratic deficit of international organi-
zations. I situate myself within this latter group.257 My analysis in the next
Section builds upon conceptions of legitimacy advanced by this group but
provides a novel perspective through which to examine legitimacy ques-
tions: that of an outward-looking theory of civil society attuned to a multi-
plicity of actors and interests.
B. The Relational, Contested, and Dynamic Legitimacy
of International Organizations
Normative legitimacy, as distinct from pragmatic or sociological legiti-
macy, can be conceptualized as the acceptance of an organization, based
254. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Pos-
sibilities, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 61, 92 (2005) ("The fact that the global public realm is uninstitu-
tionalised and 'weak' should not be seen as overly problematic. The absence of a single
legislature does not mean that there can be no rule of law nor a live sphere of political
contestation."); see also Esty, supra note 232, at 1514 (arguing that mechanisms that require
supranational authorities to be responsive to the concerns and needs of the publics they serve
can lend "a degree of quasi-democratic legitimacy" to international organizations).
255. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 230, at 17.
256. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 232, at 1490; Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note
230, at 26 ("In our view, international lawyers can no longer credibly argue that there are no
real democracy or legitimacy deficits in global administrative governance because global reg-
ulatory bodies answer to states, and the governments of those states answer to their voters
and courts.").
257. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 23, at 403, 433-37; Joshua Cohen &
Charles Sabel, Global Democracy, 37 N.Y.U. J. Irrr'. L. & POL. 763, 765-66 (2006).
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on an assessment that it employs the right goals and procedures. 258 In the
case of supranational institutions, actors external to them form "legitimacy
communities" that articulate particular understandings of what these right
goals and procedures entail (legitimacy claims).259 These claims can be
based on whether an organization is congruent with particular modes of
democratic governance (representative, participatory, or deliberative de-
mocracy claims), but legitimacy claims are not limited to democratic legiti-
macy. Rather, they may concern procedural legitimacy (conformance to
norms and procedures); functional or performance-based legitimacy (de-
livery of promised outcomes); or justice-based legitimacy (conformance to
particular substantive justice standards). 260 Unlike in the domestic sphere,
where there is a set of generally accepted legitimacy criteria-most funda-
mentally democratic and constitutional legitimacy-in the international
sphere, where these criteria are not directly applicable, there is considera-
ble normative disagreement regarding how to evaluate the legitimacy of
international organizations.
International organizations are subject to often opposing expectations
from external actors (states, businesses, or organizations of civil society)
regarding their proper roles and substantive commitments. These legiti-
macy communities will seek to establish accountability relationships with
international organizations to both validate their claims and compel them
to meet them.261 Thus, legitimacy in the international context can be con-
ceptualized as both relational (because it is built by dialectical relation-
ships between international organizations and external actors) and
contested (because different external actors will disagree on what the le-
gitimacy of international organizations requires). Additionally, because in-
ternational organizations adjust their purposes and functions in response
to demands by these external actors, their legitimacy is dynamic.262 Thus,
the challenge in developing a standard of legitimacy for international orga-
nizations is to provide a reasonable basis to achieve coordinated support
in the face of serious and persistent normative disagreements about their
proper institutional roles and accountability relationships, especially when
such disagreements cannot be addressed directly through democratic and
constitutional legitimacy mechanisms available at the national level.263
Upon which reasonable bases might consensus regarding the right to
rule of international organizations be built? Buchanan and Keohane pro-
pose three minimal substantive justice requirements (minimal moral ac-
258. See, e.g., Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 145 (2008) (similarly defining
"legitimacy" as acceptance of an organization's procedures and ultimate goals).
259. See, e.g., Julia Black, Legitimacy, Accountability and Polycentric Regulation: Di-
lemmas, Trilemmas and Organisational Response, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SET-
TERs 215, 243, 252-53 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
260. See, e.g., id.
261. Id. at 254.
262. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 23, at 433.
263. See id. at 418.
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ceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional integrity)264 and two
additional procedural requirements (the development of "epistemic-delib-
erative relationships" between international organizations and both demo-
cratic states and transnational civil society). 265 According to Buchanan
and Keohane, a key procedural feature of a standard of legitimacy for in-
ternational organizations is the existence of channels whereby transna-
tional civil society can contest and debate existing accountability
relationships, including both the terms of accountability (i.e. the particular
legitimacy claims that particular accountability relationships seek to vali-
date) and the identity of the proper accountability holders.266 In sum,
competing claims about what the legitimacy of international organizations
requires must be subject to ongoing scrutiny and be open to revision. In
the absence of a global democracy, the "requirement of a functioning
transnational civil society channel of accountability .. . helps to compen-
sate for the limitations of accountability through democratic state
consent. "267
But what does the "transnational civil society channel" look like?
How does it incorporate the different types of actors that make up civil
society? I take these questions as the starting point for developing a theory
of civil society in the next Section that can contribute to the legitimacy of
international organizations.
Legitimacy concerns are less salient when international organizations
serve a purely coordinating function that can be discharged by relying on
technical expertise. They are more prominent, however, when interna-
tional organizations address politically or normatively charged issues and
when these organizations enjoy significant power and autonomy to make
decisions. The theory of civil society I develop in the next Section is partic-
ularly valuable in this latter scenario, where there is likely to be considera-
ble disagreement regarding the proper normative role of international
organizations. 268
C. Toward a Legitimacy-Enhancing Theory of Civil Society:
A Proposal
A theory of civil society that aims to contribute to the legitimacy of
international organizations cannot regard civil society as either exclusively
inward-looking or as a partner of state and business actors. Inward-look-
ing theories conceive of civil society organizations as entirely private-re-
garding or strategic. Thus, at best, they can lend pragmatic legitimacy-
that is, legitimacy grounded simply on self-interest-to international orga-
264. Id. at 419-24.
265. Id. at 432-33.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 232, at 1511-12.
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nizations. 269 On the other hand, boundary-crossing theories threaten to
dilute the political role of civil society as a watchdog and critic of both
government and market activity. My claim is that only an outward-looking
conceptualization can justify a legitimacy-enhancing role for civil society.
Thus, a Habermasian critical theory is the best candidate. Nevertheless,
Habermasian critical scholars remain insufficiently attentive to the mecha-
nisms whereby divergent normative opinions emerge. Feminist, minority,
and Third World perspectives provide a corrective by pointing out how
spaces of rational deliberation can paradoxically serve to silence minority
dissent, and by emphasizing that the emergence of alternative viewpoints
will often require allowing for different forms of communication and the
creation of smaller communities of interest where particular alternative
identities can take shape. Therefore, I propose a capacious understanding
of Habermasian critical theory that imagines civil society as constituting an
autonomous space where different normative legitimacy claims are con-
structed and debated (and where consensus is sought) but that also recog-
nizes that fostering inward-looking qualities is often a prerequisite for the
emergence of divergent minority voices and for their crucial contribution
to debates in society at large.
1. Habermasian Foundation
My starting point are two fundamental premises of outward-looking
Habermasian critical theory: (1) the concept of civil society as distinct
from both the market and the state-where individuals interact with each
other to create, interpret, criticize, and transmit meaning, and where dif-
ferent normative conceptions of what global justice requires (and how in-
ternational organizations should contribute to it) can be developed; and
(2) the concept of an overarching public sphere that enables the effective
expression of criticism and dissent.270 It then incorporates critiques and
insights from feminist/Third World and from civic republican/social capital
theories, namely: (1) the importance of not valuing ostensibly dispassion-
ate, logical discussion over personal narratives for the articulation of mi-
nority perspectives; and (2) the importance of consensus-seeking
deliberation and local face-to-face interactions.
Why are these two premises from Habermasian critical theory crucial
for a theory of civil society that will lend legitimacy to international orga-
nizations? First, international organizations are subject to two types of le-
gitimacy claims from external actors: normative and pragmatic. Normative
legitimacy grounds the acceptance of an institution's right to rule on an
assessment of whether it follows the right goals and procedures. Pragmatic
legitimacy, on the other hand, is grounded simply on self-interest. That is,
external actors may deem an organization legitimate simply because of its
269. See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Ap-
proaches, 20 ACAD. MGmT. REV. 571, 578 (1995) (defining pragmatic legitimacy as relying on
the "self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences").
270. See supra Part I.E.2.
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instrumental value in fulfilling their own interests either directly or indi-
rectly. Plainly, pragmatic legitimacy claims are attempts at rent-seeking
that do not contribute to the debate regarding the proper role of interna-
tional organizations. 271 But although civil society organizations can simply
act to assert their self-interests against others, they often also make claims
about justice, the rightness of a particular position, or what the public
good requires. A civil society that is autonomous from both profit motives
and institutionalized decision making has the capacity to articulate a vari-
ety of normative perspectives that allows us to avoid having policies driven
solely by market or bureaucratic rationality. These perspectives are partic-
ularly important in the case of international organizations, where there
exists significant disagreement regarding their right roles and purposes.
Thus, allowing and preserving the capacity of civil society to analyze and
challenge fundamental assumptions about the right goals and competen-
cies of international organizations is crucial for a legitimizing theory of
civil society.
Second, Habermasian critical scholars rightly emphasize the impor-
tance of a single public sphere autonomous from both profit motives and
state control where all those who wish to participate bracket their inequal-
ities and debate public policy (rather than only advance their self-interest)
by appealing to "public reason," that is by translating particular concerns
into expressions of general interest. The key insight here is that politically-
oriented, outward-looking, autonomous communities can create new ways
of imagining the world that challenge unjustified or insufficiently justified
policies, as well as underlying assumptions or ideologies behind dominant
norms. An overarching public sphere serves as an interface between civil
society critique and bureaucratic structures (such as, for example, states
and international organizations). This contestatory role of civil society
takes seriously claims of democratic deficit, but understands democracy to
be "as much about opposition to arbitrary exercise of power as it is about
collective self-government." 272
2. Feminist/Third World and Social Capital Expansions
While crucial for my proposed theory of civil society, these two prem-
ises are insufficient. As Third World, feminist, and minority critiques have
emphasized, the norms of deliberation of a single public sphere are likely
to reflect the cultural preferences of dominant groups, and thus exclude or
devalue the speech of minorities.273 The dominance of public spaces of
deliberation by only a small portion of the international community is a
significant problem for a theory of civil society that seeks to legitimize
271. For example, powerful pharmaceutical companies may seek accountability rela-
tionships with the World Trade Organization to ensure it acts in their interest, such as by
globalizing U.S. patent laws that are generally favorable to their interests. Normative legiti-
macy claims may pursue the same end goal, for example the harmonization of substantive
patent law, but their reasons are based on moral claims rather than pragmatic interests.
272. Ian Shapiro, Elements of Democratic Justice, 24 POL. THEORY 579, 582 (1996).
273. See supra Part I.E.3.
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international organizations by reference to civil society's contestatory
function. This is because within civil society, well-funded and better-organ-
ized groups-whose interest may already be in line with those in a position
of power in international organizations-may pose a threat to the emer-
gence of alternative, minority views. If the ideal Habermasian public
sphere is in fact dominated by the same types of voices that run both the
state and international organizations, civil society may paradoxically lose
its ability to criticize these actors.
But a critical framework based on both the concept of civil society as a
space where meaning is created, interpreted, criticized, and transmitted,
and on the idea of a single public sphere, is capacious enough to incorpo-
rate this critique. Multiple publics can coexist with a more encompassing,
broader public sphere and, I argue, both are necessary. Smaller publics are
important: they allow the emergence of minority views and critiques by
providing "spaces of withdrawal and regroupment" in relative indepen-
dence from dominant views, and by relying on multiple modes of delibera-
tion to elicit these minority views and critiques.274 But minority
communities can devolve into isolated enclaves. 275 A broad public sphere
that translates concerns articulated in smaller publics into generalizable
arguments is thus an important bridge between "counterpublics" and rele-
vant institutional actors.
A broad public sphere serves another important role: it can help iden-
tify areas of substantive agreement about the proper role of international
organizations. Indeed, in my view, although minority and feminist criti-
ques are correct that oftentimes multiple perspectives will not be reducible
to a single "common good," they tend to be overly skeptical of any efforts
to reach consensus. Their insistence on the existence of distinct "feminine"
or "minority" perspectives endowed with a type of immutable quality runs
the risk of ossifying empirical realities that are often paradoxically the re-
sult of majority hegemony. For example, the perception that women are
less able to engage in abstract, rational debate than men, arguably does
not represent an essential attribute of females but one that is historically
contingent.276 Here, Habermasian critical theory and republican theory
overlap by acknowledging "the possibility of settling at least some norma-
tive disputes with substantively right answers." 277 In contrast to civic re-
publican theory, however, I argue that civil society organizations can
catalyze discussions based on principles regarding how international orga-
nizations should contribute to global justice claims, in addition to discus-
sions driven by self-interest.
274. Fraser, supra note 32, at 68.
275. Id. at 67.
276. See, e.g., Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity
Crisis in Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN THEORY,
REINTERPRETATION, AND APPLICATION 434, 435 (Nancy Tuana & Rosemarie Tong eds.,
1995) (criticizing gender essentialism, and reviewing the debate between cultural and radical
feminists on whether being "female" entails possessing particular essential attributes).
277. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1541.
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A second insight, this time from social capital theory, serves to further
refine my proposal. If we agree that small counterpublics are necessary to
develop minority identities and views, and that these groups run the risk of
turning into isolated enclaves lest they engage with society at large, then
empirical data regarding how groups can promote individual engagement
with broader societal debates is crucial. Specifically, social capital theory
emphasizes the importance of involvement in local community, of engag-
ing in frequent face-to-face interaction with others, and of fostering multi-
ple, overlapping (or bridging) memberships for developing a sense of
shared responsibility in participating in public life. In practice, this insight
can be translated to promoting the formation of local groups that can fos-
ter the direct participation of those whose interests, while affected by the
policies of international organizations, are not represented in the over-
arching public sphere. This can take place, for example, through commu-
nity organizing campaigns.
3. Implementation
In practice, this proposal may be implemented through a three-phase
process that fosters: (1) the creation of local spaces to facilitate the emer-
gence of different normative perspectives, (2) the creation of bridging
spaces to promote conversations among different communities, and (3) the
creation of broader spaces that are able to translate these concerns into
generalizable arguments. For example, to encourage the emergence of mi-
nority perspectives, existing civil society organizations and national gov-
ernments would first identify those populations, groups, or individuals that
are likely to be affected by the particular international policy at issue, or
that are the explicit targets of international regulation (in the case of UN-
GASS, these groups would include, among others, sex workers, injectable
drug users, and people living with HIV/AIDS). To foster their direct input,
funds could be earmarked to subsidize grassroots organizing campaigns
that bring together similarly situated individuals. To encourage participa-
tion, local meetings would focus on sharing experiences and on recon-
structing identities and novel narratives from these experiences. The
crucial aspect of phase one is to recognize that affected individuals need
spaces to develop their own perspectives. Multiple local meeting spaces
would foster face-to-face interactions that social capital theories have
found crucial for promoting the type of social cohesiveness that is likely to
lead to sustained engagement in political life.
In phase two, "cross-community" programs could be implemented to
encourage "different groups . . . to engage constructively with each other
through communication and dialogue." 278 Through cross-community pro-
grams, groups can discover common interests or concerns, and can be ex-
posed to, and often persuaded by, different normative perspectives. These
programs would foster bridging social capital, thereby discouraging the
278. Strategy #4: Change Through Cross Community Work, Civic VOICES, http://www.
civicvoicesforpeace.org/cross-community-work.htmil (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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creation of isolated and potentially illiberal enclaves, which constitute a
potential risk of the emergence of multiple publics.279
The third phase could take place through regional and national civil
society task forces, composed of civil society organizations with sufficient
capacity and experience, charged with translating concerns and exper-
iences emerging from local community groups into broader priorities and
generalizable arguments. To avoid the distortion of views, this phase
should include mechanisms to ensure the participation of representatives
from diverse multiple publics.
In all three phases, the key is the creation of formal fora independent
both from the administrative structure of international organizations and
sovereign states, and from business interests, where civil society actors can
develop an analysis and critique not only of particular implementation
measures, but also of underlying assumptions regarding the proper role
and scope of authority of particular international organizations.
International organizations are subject to a variety of legitimacy de-
mands from diverse nonstate actors, including business interests, and often
will respond to these legitimacy claims by adjusting their purposes and
functions. The proposal advanced here does not ensure, however, that in-
ternational organizations will take into account norms developed within
civil society, or that debates within civil society will reach substantive con-
sensus regarding how international organizations should contribute to
global justice. Indeed, the civil society participation structure that I have
proposed here may be criticized for constituting a form of procedural jus-
tice that does nothing to ensure substantive justice.280
But this objection underappreciates the capacity of my proposal to
criticize the normative goals of international organizations, and thus to
better secure substantive justice. First, because it seeks to actively foster
the emergence of views from all those likely to be affected by particular
policies, it is poised to generate a more complete set of relevant informa-
tion and, thus, to lead to more "accurate" policies.281 Second, because it
affords all those affected the opportunity to "tell their story in a meaning-
ful way," it will give participants the satisfaction of having been heard.282
279. BARBARA J. NELSON, LINDA KABOOLIAN & KATHRYN A. CARVER, THE CON-
CORD HANDBOOK: How To BUILD SOCIAL CAPITAL ACROSS COMMUNITIES (2003), available
at http://concord.sppsr.ucla.edu/concord.pdf.
280. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1031, 1046-47 (2003) ("It is not clear, however, that procedural requirements enhancing pub-
lic participation will necessarily lead to substantive decisions that are more responsive to
public opinion. While enhancing participation procedures to equalize opportunities is an im-
portant step in creating the preconditions for political justice, it provides no guarantee that
the substantive decision will embody political justice.") (internal citations omitted).
281. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 272, 289
(2004) (noting that an important feature of procedural justice is to strive for "accurate out-
comes," which require that all crucial information be both available and taken into account).
282. Id. at 273. These two advantages of my proposal correspond to what Lawrence
Solum has termed the "accuracy" and "satisfaction" models of procedural justice. Id. at
242-267.
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Finally, and most importantly, because the theory of civil society I advo-
cate pays particular attention to allowing for the powerful emergence of
critique that examines underlying normative premises, it will also lead to
better substantive outcomes, both in the short and long term. Better short-
term outcomes will result from displacing existing civil society participa-
tion regimes that tend either to depoliticize civil society by over relying on
collaborative models of implementation or to pay insufficient attention to
the actual dominance of certain cultural norms and perspectives in the in-
ternational scene. Additionally, this conceptualization of civil society will
have long-term, systemic gains as it has the potential to serve as a spring-
board for the emergence of other forces (such as new epistemic communi-
ties and social movements) that can contribute to the ongoing scrutiny and
debate regarding the proper role of international organizations.
CONCLUSION
In the past two decades, as the reach of international organizations
has expanded, so has the number of civil society organizations that seek to
influence international policy making and national implementation efforts.
Diverse types of international organizations have enacted consultative
mechanisms to incorporate civil society input into decision-making and
implementation processes. Nevertheless, and despite its widespread use,
the concept of civil society remains undertheorized in the legal literature.
In this Article, I first unpacked different theoretical conceptions of civil
society that underlie divergent uses of the term. I proposed that civil soci-
ety can be understood as disaggregated into a series of functions that
range from inward- to outward-looking. I then argued that five groups of
theories from the fields of political science and sociology map onto this
disaggregated framework, can justify and critique existing designs of civil
society engagement in monitoring and implementation, and suggest novel
institutional designs. Using UNGASS as a case study, I illustrated how
these five groups of theories suggest five different monitoring regime de-
signs based on: (1) delegation to market-ordered, apolitical private associa-
tions, (2) deference to the state, (3) inclusion of minority voices, (4)
contestation of state action, and (5) collaboration among all stakeholders.
These five types of regime design are relevant not only to UNGASS moni-
toring, but also to a wide range of monitoring regimes that engage civil
society, such as those for the implementation of human rights and environ-
mental commitments. More broadly, unpacking different conceptions of
civil society can both illuminate theories that underlie existing practice and
expand the range of possible institutional design options not only for mon-
itoring regimes but also for other structures of civil society participation in
policy making and implementation.
In the last portion of this Article I engaged normatively with debates
regarding whether civil society can contribute to the legitimacy of the in-
ternational legal system. I argued that implicit in the positions adopted by
both critics and proponents of civil society participation as a legitimating
factor are divergent underlying theoretical understandings of civil society.
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I then showed how the framework developed in this Article can both illu-
minate these divergent understandings and help guide the development of
a theory of civil society that can best justify a legitimacy-enhancing func-
tion of civil society. Specifically, I developed a theory of civil society based
on a capacious interpretation of Habermasian critical theory. I argued that
civil society can contribute to the legitimacy of international organizations
by constituting a space where different normative legitimacy claims are
constructed and debated, and where consensus (even if limited) on what
the legitimacy of international organizations requires can be reached. This
understanding of civil society is particularly important in issue areas likely
to engender normative disagreement about the proper role of inter-
national institutions, where legitimacy questions are of particular
importance.

